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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Purpose
The term "limited partnership" denotes a business organiza-
tion in which the liability of at least one partner, the "limited part-
ner," for the debts and obligations of the partnership is limited to
his contribution1 to the partnership, whereas the other members of
the partnership, the "general partners," may incur unlimited per-
sonal liability.2 The limited partnership3 is currently used primar-
1. Section 101 of the REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACr defines contribution
as "any cash, property, services rendered, or a promissory note or other binding obligation
to contribute cash or property or to perform services, which a partner contributes to a lim-
ited partnership in his capacity as a partner." REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT
§ 101 (1976) (act superceded in 1985 by the 1985 ULPA) [hereinafter RULPA].
2. See Lewis, The Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 716
(1917).
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ily as a public or private investment vehicle in oil and gas, mining,
and real estate ventures.4 Limited partnerships recently have be-
come more popular, primarily because they receive advantageous
tax treatment5 and provide investors with the shelter of limited
liability.6
Although many scholars have commented on the tax consider-
ations associated with limited partnerships, 7 commentators virtu-
ally have ignored the issue of intrapartnership dispute resolution.8
This Note sets forth and analyzes the issues surrounding the re-
moval of general partners from the limited partnership as a
method of resolving intrapartnership disputes.9 Part II discusses
the partnership agreement, its functions and contents, and high-
lights removal provisions that may prevent many potential part-
nership disputes. Part II also considers the applicable uniform leg-
islation and the various rules promulgated by state securities
3. A limited partnership formed in compliance with statutory requirements has one or
more general partners and one or more limited partners. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT
§ 1 (1916) (act superceded in 1976 by RULPA) [hereinafter ULPA]; RULPA § 101(7)(1976);
UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AT § 101(7)(1985) [hereinafter 1985 ULPA].
4. See J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 26, at 150 (1968) [hereinafter
CRANE & BROMBERG]; Buxbaum, Understanding California's New Limited Partnership Act,
4 CAL. LAW. 1, 13-15 (May 1984); Note, Partnerships: The Uniform Limited Partnership
Act or the Partnership Agreement-Which Controls?, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 681 (1979).
Investments in public and private limited partnerships exceeded $17 billion in 1984,
including $10.4 billion in real estate ventures and $3.1 billion in oil and gas ventures. News
Report, J. AcCT., April 1985, 31, 31-4. Robert A. Stranger & Co., a leading investment
research firm that released this data, additionally determined that private transactions con-
stitute fifty-three percent of the total partnership market. Id. Furthermore, income-oriented
limited partnerships account for fifty-three percent of annual fund raising. Id.
5. For information regarding the prevalence of the limited partnership as a vehicle to
gain favorable tax treatment, see The Report of the Committee on Ways and Means, Tax
Shelters. Use of Limited Partnerships, reprinted in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, Limited
Partnerships: Investment Vehicles in Transition 367 (1975).
6. Limited investor liability is protected by uniform legislation. See ULPA § 1 and
official comment; RULPA § 303; 1985 ULPA § 303. For further information detailing the
advantages of selecting a limited partnership rather than a sole proprietorship, general part-
nership, or corporation as the preferred form of business organization, see generally Cole-
man & Weatherbie, Special Problems in Limited Partnership Planning, 30 Sw. L.J. 887
(1976).
7. See, e.g., Haims & Strock, Federal Income Tax Classification of Limited Partner-
ships Formed Under the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 489
(1978); Weidner, The Existence of State and Tax Partnerships: A Primer, 11 FLA. ST. U.L.
R v. 1 (1983).
8. See Roulac, Resolution of Limited Partnership Disputes: Practical and Procedural
Problems, 10 REAL PROP. PROBATE AND TR. J. 276 (1975).
9. Professor Stephen Roulac's pre-RULPA article examined the difficulties inherent in
resolving partnership disputes. This Note examines the use of removal provisions in the
partnership agreement to resolve intrapartnership disputes.
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administrators. Part III addresses the collateral effects of removing
a general partner, including federal income tax consequences, ex-
posure of the limited partners to general liability, and the post-
removal status of the partnership's contracts with third parties.
Part IV outlines and examines the substitution of a new general
partner to the partnership and the potential legal claims the for-
mer general partner may have against the partnership. Part V sug-
gests specific legislation that would provide limited partners with
an effective means, through a statutory grant of power to remove a
general partner, of supervising their investments. Finally, Part VI
concludes that legislators should grant limited partners a statutory
right to remove a general partner as a means of protecting their
investment and as a method of resolving intrapartnership disputes.
B. Historical Background
At common law limited partnerships were nonexistent because
individuals who shared in the profits of a noncorporate enterprise
also were required to share unconditionally in the losses.10 In 1822
the New York legislature adopted the first statute in the United
States recognizing the limited partnership.1 Designed to employ
and utilize dormant capital and stimulate investment activity, the
New York act restricted the limited partners' liability for partner-
ship debts to the amount of their contributions to the partner-
ship.12 By the early 1900s every state had adopted legislation rec-
ognizing and governing limited partnerships. 18 Despite the
enactment of these statutes, the judiciary perpetuated the common
law's hostility toward limited liability. Generally, courts viewed
limited partners as general partners and the grant of immunity
from personal liability was contingent on full and exact compliance
with the statutory requirements. Furthermore, courts strictly con-
strued these statutory requirements. 4 Courts imposed general lia-
10. Comment, Limited Partner Control and Liability Under the Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act, 32 Sw. L. J. 1301, 1301 (1979); see CA.NE & BROMBERG, supra note
4, § 26(a), at 144; Basye, A Survey of the Limited Partnership Form of Business Organiza-
tion, 42 OR. L. REv. 35, 36 (1962).
11. Act of April 17, 1822, ch. 244, 1822 N.Y. Laws, 259.
12. See ULPA § 1, official comment. The Act was modeled after the Societe en Com-
mendite of the French Commercial Code. See Lewis, supra note 2, at 716.
13. See ULPA § 1, official comment. The majority of these statutes incorporated the
language of the New York statute with few material alterations. Id.
14. CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 4, § 26(a), at 144. Even an inconsequential devia-
tion from statutory requirements often resulted in the imposition of personal liability on
limited partners. See, e.g., Andrews v. Schott, 10 Pa. 47 (1848) (using word "company" in
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bility regardless of the good faith of the limited partners and with-
out requiring deception of the partnership's creditors. 15 Gradually,
the limited partnership became known as a liability trap for the
unwary investor rather than as a practical noncorporate form of
business organization.'6 Consequently, remedial legislation was
necessary to alleviate the threat of unlimited personal liability for
limited partners due to trivial infractions of the applicable
statutes.
17
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws drafted the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) to dis-
courage strict judicial interpretations of the early limited partner-
ship statutes.' The ULPA expressly abrogated the general rule
that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly
construed.'9 The drafters sought to encourage the use of limited
partnerships as an alternative to the corporate form of doing busi-
ness; 20 thus, the ULPA eliminated the imposition of unlimited per-
the limited partnership's name and absence of original cash contribution converted the lim-
ited partner into a general partner); cf. Rathke v. Griffith, 36 Wash. 2d 394, 218 P.2d 757
(1950) (denying limited partner was personally liable despite status as director because he
never functioned as such); see also ULPA § -1, official comment; Comment, supra note 10, at
1302.
15. Basye, supra note 10, at 37.
16. See id.; Lewis, supra note 2, at 720-21.
17. Drafters of the ULPA noted that strict judicial interpretations of the early limited
partnership statutes prevented any practical use of the statutory provisions. See Lewis,
supra note 2, at 720-21.
18. See Henningsen v. Barnard, 117 Cal. App. 2d 352, 359, 255 P.2d 837, 841 (1953);
Rathke v. Griffith, 36 Wash. 2d 394, 218 P.2d 757 (1950); Comment, supra note 10, at 1302.
The ULPA was not intended to codify existing laws regulating limited partnerships; instead,
the act was remedial in nature. Basye, supra note 10, at 37. Professor Lewis, one of the
ULPA's drafters, commented that:
The Conference on Uniform State Laws in preparing a limited partnership act had a
larger problem to face than merely to choose the best among the conflicting provisions
of existing state statutes. No existing limited partnership act, and no combination of
the provisions of existing acts would make a satisfactory uniform statute. Existing acts
[were] in more than one respect fundamentally defective.
Lewis, supra note 2, at 718. Professor Lewis further noted that the Conference desired:
to present to the legislatures of the several states an act, under which a person willing
to invest his money in a business for a share in the profits, may become a limited
partner with the same sense of security from any possibility of unlimited liability as
the subscribers to the shares of a corporation.
Id. at 720.
19. ULPA § 28(1) states that "the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law
are to be strictly construed shall have no application to this act." See Stowe v. Merrilees, 6
Cal. App. 2d 217, 44 P.2d 368 (1935) (holding that the ULPA is remedial in nature and must
be construed to effectuate this purpose and to protect the public).
20. The Commissioners intended to make available an attractive business organiza-
tion; therefore, the Commissioners premised the ULPA on two fundamental principles:
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sonal liability on limited partners due to minor deviations from the
statutory provisions.2' Indeed, the ULPA requires only substantial
good faith compliance with its provisions to prevent a technical de-
fect in the formation of the partnership from giving rise to general
liability.22
The ULPA23 defines a limited partnership as "a partnership
First: No public policy requires a person who contributes to the capital of a business,
acquires an interest in the profits, and some degree of control over the business, to
become bound for obligations of the business, provided creditors have no reason to
believe at the times their credits were extended that such person was so bound. Sec-
ond: That persons in business should be able, while remaining themselves liable with-
out limit for the obligations contracted in its conduct, to associate with themselves
others who contribute to the capital and acquire rights of ownership, provided that
such contributors do not compete with creditors for the assets of the partnership.
ULPA § 1, official comment. Although both the corporate and limited partnership forms of
business organization offer limited investor liability, the limited partnership offers "a degree
of flexibility in defining the relations among the partners that is not available in the corpo-
rate form." Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the RULPA. The consensual relationship
among the parties forces the general partners to seek the limited partners' approval for
certain decisions, whereas corporate management would not be so compelled. Id. Addition-
ally, the Internal Revenue Code does not treat the limited partnership, unlike the corpora-
tion, as a separate legal entity for federal income tax purposes. I.R.C. § 701-702 (1982). See
generally Bromberg, Preface to Limited Partnership: Model Agreement and Certificate, 26
S. TEx. L. J. 15, 16 & n.2 (1985).
21. See Plasteel Prods. Corp. v. Helman, 271 F.2d 354, 356 (1st Cir. 1959) (holding
that the limited partners did not incur personal liability despite control over selection of
partnership's general sales manager); Basye, supra note 10, at 38.
22. ULPA § 2(2). Section 2(2) ensures that limited partners are not exposed to unlim-
ited liability due to a technical defect in the partnership's formation when they have sub-
stantially complied with the statutory requirements of section 2(1). See, e.g., Franklin v.
Rigg, 143 Ga. App. 60, 237 S.E.2d 526 (1977); Tiburon Nat'l Bank v. Wagner, 265 Cal. App.
2d 868, 875, 71 Cal. Rptr. 832, 837 (1968). But see Inland Real Estate Corp. v. Christoph,
107 Ill. App. 3d 183, 437 N.E.2d 658 (1981); Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc.,
88 Wash. 2d 400, 562 P.2d 244 (1976) (holding that limited partnerships are statutory crea-
tures and parties creating limited partnerships must follow statutory requirements). Failure
to comply with the ULPA's set requirements for establishing a limited partnership pre-
cludes such formation, renders the organization a general partnership, and results in the
imposition of unlimited personal liability on limited partners. Peerless Mills, Inc. v. Amer.
Tel. & Tel. Co., 527 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1975); Dwinell's Central Neon v. Cosmopolitan Chi-
nook Hotel, 21 Wash. App. 929, 587 P.2d 191 (1978).
23. Twenty-four states, the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands have adopted
the ULPA subject to local modifications. ALASKA STAT. § 32.10.010-.290 (1962); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 41-20 to 229 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.01-.32 (West 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-9-1
to 91 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 425-21 to 52 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106 1/2, § 44 - 73
(Smith - Hurd 1959); IND. CODE § 23-4-2 to 2-30 (1971); Ky. REV. STAT. § 362.410 - .700
(1970); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31 § 151 - 181 (1964); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-13-1 to 57
(1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 359.010 - .290 (Vernon); NEV. REV. STAT. § 88.010 - .310 (1973);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 305:1 - :30 (1966); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-2-1 to 30 (1978); N.Y. PART-
NERSHIP LAW § 90 - 120 (McKinney 1948); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-1 - 30 (1973); PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. tit. 59 § 501 - 545 (1970); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 48-6-1 to 64 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 61-2-101 to 130 (1953); TEx. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a (Vernon 1970); UTAH CODE ANN.
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formed by two or more persons . .. having as members one or
more general partners. 2 4 General partners manage the limited
partnership and may incur unlimited personal liability for the
partnership's debts. 25 Limited partners do not incur personal lia-
bility beyond the amount of their partnership contributions,2 6 but
they are prohibited from taking an active role in the management
of the partnership. Limited partners who take part "in the control
of the business '27 are subject to unlimited personal liability and,
therefore, essentially are considered to be general partners. The
statutory disjunction between limited liability and managerial con-
trol originates from the same policy conflict that provoked courts
to strictly construe the pre-ULPA statutes.2 8 This conflict arose
between the policy protecting the reliance interest of third par-
ties2 9 and the policy supporting the limited liability of investors.30
The ULPA drafters reconciled the two interests by requiring the
limited partnership to include a general partner to accept unlim-
ited personal liability for partnership obligations and to control the
limited partners' investments.31 This resolution assured creditors
that at least one member of the partnership would remain fully
§ 48-2-1 to 27 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11 §§ 1391-1419 (1984); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 26,
§§ 201-228 (1970); VA. CODE §§ 50-44 to 73 (1950).
24. ULPA § 1.
25. ULPA § 9. Section 9 states in pertinent part: "[a] general partner shall have all
the rights and powers and be subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of a partner in a
partnership without limited partners. . . ." See Atlanta Warehouses, Inc. v. Housing Au-
thority, 143 Ga. App. 588, 239 S.E.2d 387 (1977) (holding general partners bound by con-
demnation judgement against partnership); Wait v. Salestrom, 206 Neb. 578, 294 N.W. 2d
338 (1980) (holding that modification of partnership agreement requires unanimous consent
of partners to be binding on general partner).
26. Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 517 S.W. 2d 420 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974), afl'd in part,
reu'd in part, 526 S.W. 2d 543 (1975); see UPLA § 1 (declaring that limited partners are not
bound by partnership obligations).
27. ULPA § 7. Determining what constitutes controlling the business "stands as the
single most difficult problem in drafting limited partnership agreements." Coleman &
Weatherbie, supra note 6, at 897. Many commentators have addressed the drafting
problems caused by limited partners actively participating in the management of the part-
nership and thereby forfeiting their limited personal liability status. See generally Basile,
Limited Liability for Limited Partners: An Argument for the Abolition of the Control Rule,
38 VAND. L. REV. 1199 (1985) (proposing abolition of the "control" rule).
28. See Coleman & Weatherbie, supra note 6, at 897; Comment, supra note 10, at
1303.
29. Third parties who rely on representations by the limited partners that they will be
responsible for the repayment of loans or the performance of contracts should be protected
from later assertions by these limited partners that they are not personally liable for* the
partnership debts.
30. See supra note 29; ULPA § 1, official comment.
31. See supra note 29.
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liable for its debts, yet enabled limited partners to limit their per-
sonal liability to the amount of their contribution. This compro-
mise also created a form of limited partnership palatable to the
courts. The ULPA drafters, however, neglected a third policy con-
sideration: the limited partners' supervisory powers over their own
investments.3 2
The drafters of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act
(RULPA) attempted to strike a balance between these three com-
peting policies of creditor protection, limited investor liability, and
investor supervision.33 The National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws promulgated the RULPA to clarify the
ambiguities and fill the interstices of the ULPA.34 For example, the
32. See Coleman & Weatherbie, supra note 6, at 897-98. The authors note that in the
years subsequent to the drafting of the ULPA, the issue of investor supervision received
greater consideration due to the stock market crash of 1929 and enactment of the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id.
33. Unlike the ULPA, the RULPA expressly sets forth the allowable degree of flexibil-
ity to be afforded drafters of partnership agreements. See infra notes 51-53 and accompany-
ing text. The RULPA allows drafters to include expanded supervisory measures for limited
partners while incorporating the creditor protection policy of the ULPA.
34. Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the RULPA (superceding the ULPA). Since its
approval by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1976,
twenty-eight states have adopted the RULPA subject to local modifications. ALA. CODE
§§ 10-9A-1 to 203 (1975); Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-301 to 366 (1976); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§
65-501 to 566 (1980); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 15511-15623 (West 1977); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 7-
62-101 to 1201 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-9 to 380 (West 1969); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, §§ 17-101 to 1107 (1974); IDAHO CODE §§ 53-201 to 267 (1947); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
545.101-.1106 (West 1946); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-1a01-1a607 (1976); MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS
CODE ANN. §§ 10-101 to 1104 (1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 109, §§ 1 - 62 (West 1975);
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 449.1101 - 2108 (West 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 322A.01-.87
(West 1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 359.011-.691 (Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-
12-501 to 1404 (1970); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 67-233 to 297 (1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:2A-1 to
72 (West 1940); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 45-1.01-01 to 62 (Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 1782.01-.62 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 54, §§ 301-364 (West 1969); 1985 OR. LAWS
Ch. 677; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-13-1 to 65 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-42-10 to 2020 (Supp.
1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 25.10.010 - .690 (1969); W. VA. CODE §§ 47-9-1 to 63 (1976);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.01 - .94 (West 1974); Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-14-201 to 1104 (1977). In most
states adopting the RULPA, the provisions of the ULPA continue to have some applicabil-
ity. Editorial Note to the RULPA. Many commentators view the RULPA as a progressive
and thoughtful improvement over the ULPA. See generally Aslanides, Cardinaldi, Hayn-
sworth, Lane & Niesar, Limited Partnerships-What's Next and What's Left?, 34 Bus.
LAW. 257 (1978); Shapiro, The Need for Limited Partnership Reform: A Revised Uniform
Act, 37 MD. L. Rav. 544 (1978); Comment, Investor Protection and the Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act, 56 WASH. L. Rav. 99 (1980). But see Hecker, The Revised Uni-
form Limited Partnership Act: Provisions Affecting the Relationship of the Firm and Its
Members to Third Parties, 27 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (1978); Kessler, The New Uniform Limited
Partnership Act: A Critique, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 159 (1979). Note, however, that the Na-
tional Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the 1985 ULPA that supercedes the
RULPA.
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RULPA maintains the dichotomy between limited liability and
partnership management instituted by the ULPA,36 yet establishes
specific activities, including the removal of general partners, in
which limited partners may engage without risking the imposition
of unlimited personal liability.36 The RULPA furthers the policy of
investor supervision by expressly authorizing limited partner de-
rivative suits, a provision absent in the ULPA.3 7 This procedural
device, analogous to the shareholder derivative suit in the corpo-
rate context,3 8 enables limited partners to protect their invest-
ments from the mismanagement, negligence, or ultra vires acts of
general partners.3 9 The RULPA also creates a statute of limita-
tions on the limited partnership's right to recover all or part of a
contribution already returned to a limited partner, whether the re-
covery is to satisfy creditors or otherwise.40
35. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
36. RULPA § 303; see infra notes 230-31 and accompanying text. See generally Burr,
The Potential Liability of Limited Partners as General Partners, 67 MAss. L. REv. 22
(1982).
37. "[T]he virtually complete control given to general partners by the [ULPA]
together with the evolution of limited partnerships from small personalized concerns to
large, impersonal enterprises, has created a situation rife with opportunities for self-dealing
and other misconduct by general partners." Hecker, Limited Partners' Derivative Suits
Under the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 33 VAND. L. REv. 343, 346 (1980). The
RULPA attempted to remedy this situation by providing that
[a] limited partner may bring an action in the right of a limited partnership to recover
a judgement in its favor if general partners with authority to do so have refused to
bring the action or if an effort to cause those general partners to bring the action is not
likely to succeed.
RULPA § 1001. Contrastingly, the ULPA did not specifically grant limited partners the
right to bring derivative suits. Nevertheless, some courts have recognized a limited partner's
standing to sue on behalf of the limited partnership when the general partners are unable to
or wrongfully refuse to do so. See, e.g., Strain v. Seven Hills Assocs., 75 A.D.2d 360, 429
N.Y.S.2d 424 (1980) (interpreting Ohio law granting limited partners the right to sue deriva-
tively). But see Millard v. Newmark & Co., 24 A.D. 2d 333, 266 N.Y.S. 2d 254 (1966) (read-
ing UPLA § 26 as an absolute prohibition against limited partner derivative suits).
38. See Hecker, supra note 37, at 344-45.
39. The court in Partnership Equities, Inc. v. Marten, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 42, 443 N.E.
2d 134 (1982), held that derivative suits serve as appropriate remedies for general partners'
mismanagement, negligence, diversion of assets, ultra vires acts, or failure to perform cer-
tain elements of the limited partnership agreement.
40. RULPA § 608. The drafters modeled section 608 after section 17 of the ULPA but
added the statute of limitations. RULPA § 608, official comment. Compare RULPA § 608
(containing statute of limitations) with ULPA § 17 (omitting statute of limitations).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Partnership Agreement
The partnership agreement is a contractual document that
sets forth the rights, responsibilities, and obligations of the part-
ners, both general and limited.4' The ULPA does not refer to the
partnership agreement; consequently, limited partners must incor-
porate vital information, such as the character and location of the
business and the share of profits each member will receive, in the
certificate of limited partnership.42 The RULPA, however, recog-
nizes the partnership agreement and its function as the basic
agreement among the partners "as to the affairs of a limited part-
nership and the conduct of its business. '
1. Functions of the Partnership Agreement
To avoid unlimited personal liability for the limited partners,
the partnership must comply with all applicable statutory require-
ments, including the filing of a certificate of limited partnership.44
The certificate and the partnership agreement constitute two sepa-
rate documents45 and, unlike the certificate, the partnership agree-
41. See FRESHMAN, PRINCIPLES OF REAL ESTATE SYNDICATION 239 (1973) cited in Rou-
lac, supra note 8, at 279.
42. ULPA § 2(1). The ULPA drafters stated that all important matters affecting lim-
ited partners should be set forth in the certificate of partnership. For a discussion of the
certificate of limited partnership, see infra footnotes 44-47 and accompanying text.
43. ULPA § 101(9); 1985 RULPA § 101(9). Modern practice dictates comprehensive
partnership agreements, only part of which needs to be included in the certificate of limited
partnership. RULPA § 101, official comment. See generally Peel, Definition of a Partner-
ship, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 989 (discussing tax elements of limited partnership agreements that
need not be included in the certificate of limited partnership).
44. See Allen v. Amber Manor Apartments Partnership, 95 Ill. App. 3d 541, 420 N.E.
2d 440 (1981); Note, supra note 4, at 682. The ULPA recognizes the formation of a limited
partnership if the parties substantially and in good faith comply with the statutory require-
ments, including filing the certificate with the specified contents for local record. ULPA
§ 2(2). Courts have held that a failure to record the certificate precludes limited partners
from claiming limited liability when dealing with third parties who have no notice of their
limited partner status. See Grenada Bank v. Willey, 705 F.2d 176 (6th Cir.) (following Ten-
nessee law), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983); Ruth v. Crane, 392 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa.
1975) (holding that upon failure to record a proper certificate, limited partners will be
treated as general partners with respect to third parties and creditors under Pennsylvania
law); ef. Mursor Builders, Inc. v. Crown Mountain Apartment Assocs., 467 F. Supp. 1316
(D.V.I. 1978) (stating that the only practical effect of recording the certificate is to shield
the limited partners from personal liability for partnership debts). The doctrine of substan-
tial compliance is carried over to the RULPA in section 201(b) (note that ULPA § 2(2)'s
good faith requirement is absent in the RULPA).
45. Kratovil & Werner, Fixing Up the Old Jalopy-the Modern Limited Partnership
Under the ULPA, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 51 (1975); Note, supra note 4, at 682. The partner-
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ment does not have a filing requirement. The certificate of limited
partnership outlines the purposes of the organization, the issues
concerning capital contribution, and the procedures to be followed
for the addition and withdrawal of partners.4 The certificate may
be drafted to describe completely the basic information regarding
partnership formation, thus making a separate partnership agree-
ment superfluous. Common practice, however, dictates that the
certificate include only the minimum statutory requirements and
that the parties draft a separate partnership agreement.47 There-
fore, the partnership agreement contains the details of the part-
ners' rights, responsibilities, and obligations; confidential agree-
ments among partners; and private business practices of the
partnership. 48 The agreement also shields this information from
public exposure, a feature not afforded the information and ar-
rangements set forth in the certificate of limited partnership.
2. Dispute Resolution Provisions
Organizing ventures as limited partnerships is beneficial be-
cause they provide flexibility in structuring the rights and duties of
the parties within the partnership agreement.49 In addition to the
provisions required by law,50 the agreement can include other pro-
visions reflecting concerns of the participants.51 Ideally, limited
partners should have a substantial role in drafting the partnership
ship agreement defines the relationships of the parties involved, whereas the certificate noti-
fies third parties who deal with the partnership of the organization's essential features.
Note, supra note 4, at 682 n.7; see, e.g., Holvey v. Stewart, 265 Or. 242, 509 P.2d 17 (1973)
(certificate notifies third parties of limited partners' limited liability); Davis v. Davis, 247
Or. 352, 429 P.2d 808 (1967) (certificate did not embody business arrangement between
members).
46. RULPA § 101, official comment.
47. See Note, supra note 4, at 682.
48. See Waters v. Harris, 17 N.Y.S. 370 (1892) (holding that the partnership agree-
ment determines the relationship among the parties and that related settlements must con-
form with the agreement); RULPA § 101, official comment; Note, supra note 4, at 682.
49. CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 4, at 4; Roulac, supra note 8, at 278. The fiduciary
obligation of the general partner to the limited partners prohibits him from acting in con-
flict with the interests of the limited partners. Roulac, supra note 8, at 287-91. Freedom of
contract gives the parties extensive flexibility in allocating their mutual rights and responsi-
bilities, and uniform legislation protects them from entering into an unenforceable agree-
ment. See generally Schwartz, Freedom of Contract Among the Owners of a Partnership or
Limited Partnership, 36 MERCER L. REV. 701 (1985) (examining the regulation of limited
partnerships' internal affairs by uniform legislation).
50. See ULPA § 2(1); RULPA § 201(a); 1985 ULPA § 201(a). See generally MOSBERG,
REAL ESTATE SYNDICATION OFFERINGS LAW AND PRACTICE 73 (1974), cited in Roulac, supra
note 8, at 279.
51. Roulac, supra note 8, at 279.
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agreement.5 2 In the overwhelming majority of partnerships, how-
ever, limited partners have no effective voice in drafting the agree-
ment.5 3 Thus, the limited partners are left with little power to su-
pervise their investment. Today, common practice dictates that the
promoter of the venture, generally a corporation, assume the role
of general partner.5 4 To promote greater investor supervision, the
general and limited55 partners should capitalize on the flexibility of
52. The role of the limited partner, however, is analogous to that of a corporate share-
holder because both seek to protect and maximize their investment, yet seldom does either
possess the economic or managerial power to influence the agreements governing their rela-
tionship with their respective investment entities. But see Abrams, Imposing Liability for
"Control" Under Section 7 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 28 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 785, 822-23 (1978). For an example of a fully negotiated limited partnership agreement,
see Limited Partnership: Model Agreement and Certificate, 26 S. TEx. L. J. 25 (1985)
(drafted by the Partnership Law Committee; Corporation Banking and Business Law
Section; State Bar of Texas) [hereinafter Model Agreement].
53. Roulac, supra note 8, at 280. In part, this lack of an effective voice stems from the
limited partners' lack of representation when the general partner's attorney drafts the origi-
nal partnership agreement. Limited partnership interests are often sold on a "take it or
leave it" basis, leaving the limited partners little bargaining power to demand revisions of
the agreement.
54. Because the general partner is subject to the risk of unlimited liability, individuals
are often deterred from assuming this role. To shield individuals from general liability, sev-
eral methods of organizing the partnership have emerged:
(1) an established corporation engaged in regular business operations enters a limited
partnership as the general partner; (2) promoters of a venture .. . desiring to retain
control while shielding themselves from unlimited liability, cast the venture in the form
of a limited partnership; they organize a corporation, in which they hold all or most of
the shares, to serve as general partner and bring in outside investors as limited part-
ners; ... and (3) persons who want to set up an enterprise as a limited partnership and
become limited partners for most or some of their investment organize a corporation in
which they become principal shareholders, directors, and officers, to act as the limited
partnership's sole general partner, thus shielding themselves from liability while retain-
ing effective control of the enterprise.
O'Neal, Comments on Recent Developments in Limited Partnership Law, 1978 WASH.
U.L.Q. 669, 683.
55. There is no limitation on the number of limited partners. See Roulac, supra note
8, at 280 n. 52 (noting that recent offerings have involved 500-1000 investors). The drafters
of early partnership agreements probably did not contemplate that a corporation could
serve as a general partner. Instead, they viewed limited partnerships as small business en-
terprises involving close contact between investors and managers. O'Neal, supra note 54, at
683. The drafters assumed that at least one individual participant would be subject to un-
limited liability. Id.; CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 4, at 146 ("the limited partnership was
conceived to accommodate only a few limited partners"). Today, partnerships generally are
no longer small and consensual. Basye, supra note 10 at 36; Hrusoff & Cazares, Formation
of the Public Limited Partnership, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 87 (1977); Comment, supra note 34, at
102. The primary concern of limited partners, protecting and monitoring their investments,
has overridden the importance of friendly relations between participants. Note, Procedures
and Remedies in Limited Partners' Suits For Breach of the General Partner's Fiduciary
Duty, 90 HARV. L. Rav. 763, 779 (1977). Amicable relations and continuity of interest
between the general and limited partners were once both the elements and result of a suc-
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the partnership agreement and include nonjudicial methods of
resolving potential intrapartnership disputes in the agreement.
Nonjudicial methods of resolving these disputes avoid the high
costs of litigation and protect partnership assets. 51
Several mechanisms exist for resolving disputes in a limited
partnership. 7 First, the parties may include an arbitration provi-
sion in the partnership agreement.5 The drafter of an arbitration
clause should exercise caution in establishing the method of choos-
ing an arbitrator.59 Limited partners should not permit the general
partner to have complete discretion in naming an arbitrator;
rather, the limited partners should insist on a voice in the decision
of who will act as arbitrator. Furthermore, arbitration agreements
may be subject to state statutory control; these state requirements
must be met for the provision to be legally enforceable.6 Second,
independent legal representation of the limited partners' interests
may be employed as an appropriate dispute resolution mecha-
nism." In fact, limited partners should retain legal counsel, or in-
cessful partnership since the general partners' compensation depended on that success
rather than on a salary or fees. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(f) [hereinafter UPA]. Today,
general partners benefit from higher fees at the expense of the limited partners' return on
their investment. Comment, supra note 35, at 103 n. 16.
56. The parties can avoid intrapartnership disputes by successfully negotiating and
including specific dispute resolution provisions in the agreement. In essence, clearly drafted
dispute resolution provisions enable the parties to assess immediately their position and
provide the parties with an alternative to litigation.
57. Buy-out arrangements, including specific provisions for fundings, may be incorpo-
rated into the agreement as a dispute resolution procedure. See Coleman & Weatherbie,
supra note 6, at 909; Massman, Buy-Sell Arrangements, in CORPORATION, BANKING AND Bus-
INESS LAW SECTION, STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PARTNERSHIP LAW at El (1976). The parties
can establish a "conflict insurance fund" which would cover the cost of legal representation
and an independent economic analysis in the event of a dispute. Roulac, supra note 8, at
308.
58. Pacific Inv. Co. v. Townsend, 58 Cal. App. 3d 1, 129 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1976) (discuss-
ing arbitration clauses in limited partnerships); see Coleman & Weatherbie, supra note 6, at
909; Roulac, supra note 8, at 306.
59. See supra note 58. The arbitrator should possess a thorough knowledge of limited
partnerships and the particular industry in which the partnership operates.
60. See, e.g., Texas General Arbitration Act, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 224-249
(Vernon 1973). The Texas General Arbitration Act sets forth strict requirements for a valid
and enforceable arbitration clause, namely that:
[a] written agreement concluded upon the advice of counsel to both parties as evi-
denced by counsels' signatures thereto to submit any existing controversy to arbitration
or a provision in a written contract concluded upon the advice of counsel to both
parties as evidenced by counsels' signatures thereto to submit to arbitration any con-
troversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id. at 224.
61. Coleman & Weatherbie, supra note 6, at 909; Roulac, supra note 8, at 308.
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duce the general partners to do so for them, not only during the
initial drafting of the partnership agreement, but also during any
subsequent intrapartnership disputes.6 2 Third, removal of the gen-
eral partner is an important nonjudicial method for resolving in-
trapartnership disputes. Because neither the ULPA, the RULPA,
nor the 1985 ULPA provides a statutory right of removal, 63 the
limited partners must negotiate the inclusion of this provision and
its specific contents.
3. Contents of Removal Provisions
Under a theory of partnership democracy, the partnership
would grant the limited partners a right to approve, by majority
vote, specific actions taken by the general partners." Partnership
voting rights promote the investment protection policy underlying
limited partnership and securities statutes because the limited
partners can oversee their investment more effectively." The part-
nership agreement may grant the limited partners voting rights
concerning the removal or election of general partners, sale of all
or substantially all of the partnership's assets, termination of the
partnership, or extraordinary managerial issues such as changing
the purpose of the business or incurring excessive debt.6 6 Of all
these voting rights, the right to remove general partners provides
the limited partners with the most direct method of influencing
partnership management and protecting their investments.6 If the
62. Ideally the limited and general partners should engage separate counsel. However,
the general partners' counsel usually drafts the partnership agreement and also serves as the
limited partnership's counsel. Roulac, supra note 8, at 308. This situation requires a clarifi-
cation as to whom the attorney actually represents. Id.
63. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
64. Coleman & Weatherbie, supra note 6, at 906. The RULPA sanctions the grant of
voting rights to limited partners by expressly providing that "the partnership agreement
may grant to all or a specified group of the limited partners the right to vote (on a per
capita or other basis) upon any matter." RULPA § 302. The limited partners, however,
cannot exercise rights beyond those enumerated in § 303(b) without risking unlimited per-
sonal liability because the official comment to § 302 expressly states that its protection is
"[slubject to Section 303."
65.' See supra notes 32, 37-40 and accompanying text.
66. Coleman & Weatherbie, supra note 6, at 906. The RULPA enumerates the specific
voting rights that the partnership agreement may grant limited partners. RULPA
§ 303(b)(5); 1985 ULPA § 303(B)(6).
67. Augustine, Fass, Lester & Robinson, The Liability of Limited Partners Having
Statutory Voting Rights Affecting the Basic Structure of the Partnership, 31 Bus. LAW
2087, 2101 (1976) [hereinafter Augustine]. Note, however, that removal provisions may in-
fluence strongly the course of the partnership's business and, therefore, may cause the impo-
sition of unlimited personal liability for the limited partners under the ULPA. Id.; see infra
1420 [Vol. 39:1407
INTRAPARTNERSHIP DISPUTES
parties intend to include a removal provision in the limited part-
nership agreement, the mechanics of the removal process should be
particularized and codified. Specific issues, including the percent-
age of limited partners needed to call a partnership meeting and
the notification requirements, must be addressed. The partnership
agreement also must specify the percentage of limited partners'
votes required to effect removal, quorum requirements, availability
of proxies, and method of valuation of the removed general part-
ner's interest.
(a) The Partnership Meeting
Removal provisions should specifically permit limited partners
constituting a predetermined partnership interest percentage, such
as ten or twenty percent, to call a partnership meeting.6 8 Alterna-
tively, limited partners satisfying a requisite percentage could be
given the right to compel the general partner to convene a partner-
ship meeting."9
The form and manner of notification to the partners of any
partnership meeting should be stipulated in the removal provision.
The provision should require the general partner to furnish the
limited partners with records disclosing the names of all parties
holding outstanding limited partnership interests.7 0 Furthermore,
the removal provision should require that the notice outline the
proposal and include the material facts and allegations necessitat-
ing the general partner's removal. Additionally, the removal provi-
sion should provide an adequate amount of time prior to the meet-
ing during which the general partner can prepare a rebuttal to the
allegations set forth in the notice.7 1
notes 222-24 and accompanying text. In contrast, the RULPA prevents the imposition of
liability and provides a "safe harbor" for limited partners exercising specific voting rights.
RULPA § 303(b)(5); see infra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
68. The limited partners' right to call a partnership meeting also could be based on
their contribution of a minimum dollar amount to the total capital investment. Coleman &
Weatherbie, supra note 6, at 907.
69. Of course, this particular procedure might be ineffective if the general partner
refuses to call the meeting. Therefore, the removal provision should authorize the limited
partners to call the meeting. Otherwise, the limited partners might have to petition the
courts in an equitable action to call for a vote.
70. See Coleman & Weatherbie, supra note 6, at 907.
71. Id. If the provision requires "cause" for removal, the general partner should re-
ceive adequate notice of the charges and an opportunity to present his rebuttal at the part-
nership meeting.
1986] 1421
1422 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1407
(b) Voting Requirements for Removal
In addition to establishing provisions controlling the partner-
ship meeting, the partnership agreement also should specify the
voting requirements for removing a general partner. Ordinarily, the
partnership agreement grants a right of removal to limited part-
ners whose aggregate interests exceed a given percentage, such as
fifty percent, of the outstanding limited partnership interests. 2
This percentage, however, is subject to negotiation. Therefore, the
general partner may seek to include a supermajority voting re-
quirement in the agreement.73 The agreement also could distribute
the voting power based on the dollar amount invested by limited
partners or on a per capita basis. 74
The partnership agreement should state whether a general
partner can be removed "without cause. '75 When the removal pro-
vision requires a showing of "good cause" 76 prior to removal the
limited partners are forced to tolerate the general partner,
purchase the general partner's interest, or litigate the existence of
"good cause. ' 77 Granting limited partners the right to remove a
general partner "without cause" allows them to avoid this costly
dilemma.78 The formation of limited partnerships with numerous
72. Id.
73. Harkleroad, Limited Partnership Practice: Rights, Duties and Liabilities of Part-
ners 98 (October 27, 1983) (presented to the Second Annual Corporate and Banking Law
Institute at Sea Island, Georgia). A supermajority voting provision requires that a percent-
age greater than 50%, such as 80%, of the limited partners' interest be voted in favor of the
general partners' removal.
74. Coleman & Weatherbie, supra note 6, at 907. Thus, the voting power of the
limited partners could be distributed according to the percentage of limited partnership
interests owned, the dollar value of those interests, or equally among the limited partners.
75. Commentators have noted that although the removal of a general partner "without
cause" appears harsh, limited partners do not need to exercise that power if the general
partner is managing the partnership profitably. .ee Model Agreement, supra note 52, at 58
& n.48; Note, Partnership: Can Rights Required to be Given Limited Partners Under the
New Tax Shelter Investment Regulations be Reconciled with Section 7 of the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act?, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 289, 295 (1973).
76. A provision specifying removal of the general partner only for "cause" should spec-
ify events triggering the provision. Mismanagement, negligence, diversion of partnership as-
sets, action without or beyond authority, or failure to perform certain elements of the part-
nership agreement are examples of possible triggering events.
77. See Model Agreement, supra note 52, at 58 & n. 48.
78. General partners can negate the harsh effects of "without cause" removal provi-
sions by negotiating for a supermajority voting requirement to effectuate removal. See
Model Agreement, supra note 52, at 58 & n. 48. The drafters of the Model Agreement
suggest a requisite vote of seventy-five percent of the limited partners' interest to remove a
general partner "without cause". The higher percentage usually will minimize arbitrary
removal of the general partner. Id.
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limited partners may compel drafters of removal provisions to in-
clude provisions for proxy voting, 9 provisions that are subject to
the proxy rules of state and federal securities laws.80 Proxy voting,
however, may permit outsiders or the limited partners to attempt a
takeover of the general partner's interest.8' A takeover bid may re-
sult in the limited partners' loss of limited liability and application
of the complex federal securities laws.82 Although the general prin-
ciples regulating takeover bids in the corporate securities area may
apply, no rules specifically regulate proxy battles or takeover at-
tempts in the limited partnership area.83 To avoid potential
problems, drafters should design carefully the proxy voting provi-
sions to curtail the use of proxies.
(c) Other Considerations,
General partners can restrict any removal power given to lim-
ited partners by negotiating.for time restrictions on the removal.
For example, the removal provision could grant the general partner
an initial grace period, possibly two or more years, during which
the limited partners could not remove the general partner.8 4 Alter-
79. Alternatively, the removal provision could provide for ballot voting. In lieu of noti-
fying the limited partners of an impending partnership meeting, the general or limited part-
ner discloses the facts and allegations to the limited partners by mail and provides the
recipients with a ballot. The ballot is then returned by the voters, indicating either opposi-
tion or approval of the proposed removal. See Lesesne v. Mast Property Management, Inc.,
251 Ga. 550, 307 S.E.2d 661 (1983).
80. See Securities and Exchange Act, § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982); CAL. CORP.
CODE § 15637(i) (West Supp. 1986)
81. Roulac, supra note 8, at 304. Professor Roulac notes that although the "takeover"
of the general partner's interest is rarely attempted, the possibility increases when the
general partner's interest is primarily "a participation in ongoing income." Id. For an exam-
ple of a takeover by a limited partner, see Weil v. Diversified Properties, 319 F. Supp. 778
(D.D.C. 1970) (illustrating situation in which the limited partners instituted takeover during
partnership financial crisis).
82. See generally Roulac, supra note 8, at 303-04; 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1),
§ 78n(d)(1),(5)-(7); Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules and State Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1249
(1960); Bromberg, Tender Offers: Safeguards and Restraints-An Interest Analysis, 21
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 613 (1970).
83. Professor Roulac suggests that proxy rules are playing an increasingly important
role in the limited partnership context:
[p~roxy requirements and even guidelines governing tender offers are not alien to the
limited partnership context . .. .The mechanics for conducting a takeover bid in the
corporate securities area are complex and subject to very specific regulation. Although
the same general principles would seem to apply to the partnership area as well, there
are no specific guidelines to suggest how such a contest might be handled in the part-
nership context.
Roulac, supra note 8, at 303.
84. Harkleroad, supra note 73, at 98. A specified grace period gives the general partner
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natively, the general partner could demand that the removal provi-
sion require notification of the reasons for removal and a time pe-
riod to correct any deficiencies or problems. 5 Because the
partnership agreement is contractual in nature, inclusion of these
provisions is subject to negotiation.
A removal provision also should include terms, triggered by a
vote to remove the general partner, specifying the effective date of
removal; rights of limited partners to elect a successor general
partner;86 and continuing rights, interests, and liabilities of the re-
moved general partner. Depending on the terms of the removal
provision, the removed general partner may be expelled from the
partnership, demoted to a passive managerial role, or converted
into a special limited partner. Although no statutory provision ex-
plicitly grants limited partners the right to expel a general partner,
section 38(1) of the UPA implicitly authorizes "expulsion of a part-
ner, bonafide under the partnership agreement." ' Therefore,
drafters should provide contractually for the expulsion of a general
partner. It must be noted, however, that expulsion of the sole gen-
eral partner may cause dissolution of the limited partnership. 8 Al-
ternatively, the removal provision may terminate the agency status
of the general partner, divest him of all managerial authority, and
permit the limited partners to appoint a partnership "manager" to
assume the general partner's managerial responsibilities. 9 Al-
an opportunity to confront and solve problems that arise in the initial phase of any business
organization. By providing a limited grace period, general partners are assured of their ten-
ure as managers and, thus, can make business decisions in the formative period of the lim-
ited partnership without seeking the continued approval of the limited partners. Cf.
Abrams, supra note 52, at 823 (arguing that removal provisions give limited partners a
weapon that forces the general partner to conduct the partnership's affairs merely to main-
tain the limited partners' approval).
85. Harkleroad, supra note 73, at 98. "Cure provisions", however, benefit general part-
ners only when the partnership agreement requires "cause" for removal.
86. See infra notes 246-55 and accompanying text.
87. UPA § 38(1); Model Agreement, supra note 52, at 58 & n.47. The ULPA and the
revised acts expressly state that the UPA governs in situations not specifically provided for
in the uniform limited partnership statutes. ULPA § 29; RULPA § 1105; 1985 RULPA
§ 1106.
88. See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
89. The "manager" would assume contractually the administrative and business func-
tion of the removed general partner. Model Agreement, supra note 52, at 58 & n.47. The
general partner would remain personally liable for partnership debts. In Weil v. Diversified
Properties, 319 F. Supp. 778 (D.D.C. 1970), the limited partners managed the business
through a manager and the general partner renounced his salary and duties as manager of
the partnership's properties. The court, however, did not address directly the issue of
replacing the general partner with a non-partner manager. Instead, the court focused on
whether the actions of the limited partners violated the "control" limitation of ULPA § 7.
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though this procedure avoids technical dissolution and reconstitu-
tion requirements,9" there are several potential problems. First,
finding a capable and experienced "manager" willing to risk the
assumption of partnership liabilities may prove difficult.9 1 Second,
the manager would need cooperation from the removed general
partner during the transition period. Realistically, however, the
limited partners and manager should not expect an overwhelming
amount of help from the general partner they recently stripped of
managerial power.2 Finally, in most situations it is unlikely that
the removed general partner will be willing to maintain the posi-
tion of general partner, risking unlimited liability, without mana-
gerial control of the partnership.
The removal provision also may convert the removed general
partner's interest into a limited partner interest. This permits the
removed general partner to retain at least part of his original part-
nership interest.9 3 As a "special limited partner," the removed gen-
eral partner has limited liability status; the partnership agreement,
however, may not grant him rights identical to those of ordinary
limited partners.9 4 If the removal provision establishes the "special
limited partner" alternative, either a substantial part of the gen-
eral partner's interest must be forfeited contractually or the re-
maining limited partners' interests will be diluted considerably.9 5
The removal provision also should condition conversion of the gen-
eral partner's interest upon removal "without cause" because
readmitting a general partner removed for "cause" merely perpetu-
ates an unsatisfactory arrangement.9 6
The removal provision should stipulate an amount, or formula
for determining an amount, constituting payment to the expelled
The court held that the limited partners' actions were required to prevent the business from
financial failure and, thus, declined to impose general liability. Id. at 782.
90. The ULPA and the RULPA require the presence of a general partner with unlim-
ited liability for the protection of creditors. ULPA § 1; RULPA § 403(b); 1985 ULPA §
403(b).
91. Model Agreement, supra note 52, at 58 & n.47. In addition, the newly-appointed
manager may find it difficult to convince creditors that he possesses the legal authority to
manage the partnership. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Section 302 of the RULPA states that "the partnership agreement may grant to all
or a specified group of the limited partners the right to vote . . . upon any matter."
RULPA § 302 (emphasis added); 1985 ULPA § 302. Thus, to prevent the removed general
partner from retaliating against the new general partner, the partnership agreement may
not grant special limited partners certain powers, such as the removal of general partners.
95. Model Agreement, supra note 52, at 58 & n.47.
96. Furthermore, equity does not compel the readmission of the general partner. Id.
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general partner for his partnership interest. The UPA, the ULPA,
and the RULPA do not state explicitly what a general partner
should receive upon expulsion. The UPA,9 7 however, provides that
an expelled partner who is discharged from all partnership liabili-
ties shall receive, in cash, "only the net amount due him from the
partnership".9" Similarly, UPA sections 38(2)(b)9 9  and
38(2)(c)(II) 100 refer to "the value of [the parties'] interest" upon
dissolution. The UPA, therefore, affords the expelled partner the
right to receive fair value payment for his partnership interest ab-
sent an express contractual provision.1'01 The removal provision
should provide a basis for determining fair value,'0 2 such as the
book value of the partner's share, a pro rata share of partnership
earnings, or a pro rata share of the appraised value of the partner-
ship's net assets.10 3 Drafters of removal provisions may want to
provide different valuation methods, dependent upon whether the
general partner was removed with or without "cause.' 0 4 If the re-
moved general partner contributed services, the removal provision
also should provide a method for evaluating those services, regard-
less of whether the general partner is expelled or merely exchang-
ing his interest. 10 5
97. UPA § 38(1).
98. Id.
99. UPA § 38(2)(b).
100. UPA § 38(2)(c)(II).
101. If, however, the general partner damaged the partnership, the general partner's
payment may be offset by the amount of damages. See UPA § 38(2)(c)(II); Model Agree-
ment, supra note 52, at 58 & n.49.
102. These terms, subject to general contractual rules, could be invalidated if they
resemble penalty clauses. Model Agreement, supra note 52, at 58 & n.49. Additionally, the
removal provision should establish either a fixed or floating rate of interest to be paid on the
removed general partner's partnership interest.
103. Practitioners are cautioned that an appraisal method may be deemed an arbitra-
tion agreement subject to regulation by state arbitration statutes. Model Agreement, supra
note 52, at 58 & n.49; see supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. Furthermore, drafters
may have difficulty specifying the various elements to be considered and weighed in apprais-
ing the partnership interest.
104. See Model Agreement, supra note 52, at 58.
105. See Coleman & Weatherbie, supra note 6, at 914; Roulac, supra note 8, at 295-96.
Exchanging the removed general partner's interest for a limited partnership interest
becomes more complicated, if not impossible, when services constitute the general partner's
contribution because § 4 of the ULPA states that "the contributions of a limited partner
may be cash or other property, but not services" (emphasis added). RULPA § 501, however,
expands § 4 of the ULPA and explicitly permits limited partners to make contributions of
services. RULPA § 501, official comment.
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B. Uniform Legislation
Although freedom of contract theories provide the limited and
general partners with great flexibililty in drafting a partnership
agreement, conflicts may arise between the business relationship
established by the agreement and the relationship permissible
under uniform legislation.106 To avoid future litigation, drafters
must ensure not only that the agreement reflects the desires of the
parties, but also that it conforms to the applicable statutory provi-
sions. The ULPA, the RULPA, and the 1985 ULPA all fail to pro-
vide limited partners with an explicit right of removal. At first
glance, this omission raises questions concerning the enforceability
of a removal provision included in the partnership agreement.10 7
The right of removal, however, is both consistent with the policies
underlying the uniform statutes'0 8 and implicit in specific statutory
provisions.
1. The Uniform Limited Partnership Act
Although the ULPA does not expressly grant limited partners
the right to remove general partners, 0 9 some courts have recog-
nized that the partnership agreement may provide for the involun-
tary dismissal of a general partner.1 0 Similarly, in construing UPA
section 30, courts have declared that they will not frustrate the
intention of the parties by imposing a good faith requirement on
the right of dismissal. This relieves the limited partners of the bur-
den of establishing good faith."' These courts, however, have
strictly scrutinized the limited partners' compliance with any con-
106. See generally Note, supra note 4, at 682-91.
107. See generally Wertheimer, Substantive Law and Special Problems of General
and Limited Partnerships in RESOURCE MATERIALS-PARTNERSHIPS: UPA, ULPA, SECURI-
TIES, TAXATION, AND BANKRUPTCY 104-05 (5th ed. 1984). The author conclusively states that a
provision not addressed in the ULPA "is enforceable and governs the relations of the part-
ners." Id.
108. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
109. However, unless otherwise provided in the partnership agreement, the UPA ex-
pressly commands that a general partnership dissolve upon expulsion of a partner. UPA §
31(1)(d).
110. See Betz v. Chena Hot Springs Group, 657 P.2d 831 (Alaska 1982); see also
Gelder Medical Group v. Webber, 41 N.Y.2d 680, 363 N.E.2d 573, 394 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1977)
(involving a general partnership).
111. See, e.g., Gelder Medical Group v. Webber, 41 N.Y.2d 680, 294 N.Y.S.2d 867
(1977) (holding that partners do not have to prove that they acted in good faith even if bad
faith would nullify the right to expel a general partner). For the vote to be nullified, the
expelled general partner must allege and prove bad faith in the formation of the original
partnership agreement.
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ditions and procedures prescribed in the partnership agreement's
dismissal provision.112
The ULPA's drafters intended for limited partners to main-
tain supervisory control over their limited partnership interest.'1 3
The official comment to section 1 of the ULPA provides that "[n]o
public policy requires a person who contributes to the capital of a
business, acquires an interest in the profits, and some degree of
control over the conduct of the business, to become bound for the
obligations of the business.' 1 4 Because their partnership invest-
ments are managed by a general partner, limited partners obvi-
ously are interested in and affected by the identity of the general
partner. 1 5 Limited partners originally consented to the identity of
the general partner by merely investing in the limited partner-
ship.116 The limited partners' concerns regarding clandestine
changes in management have been alleviated by section 9(1) of the
ULPA, which prohibits the admission of a person as general part-
ner without the consent of all the limited partners. 17 This unani-
mous voting requirement reflects the ULPA drafters' intention to
give the limited partners an effective control mechanism over
changes in the general partner's identity subsequent to formation
of the limited partnership." 8 This policy of granting the limited
partners greater control over the direction of the partnership ex-
tends to the limited partners' removal rights because removal also
serves as a device to ensure that the limited partners have an effec-
112. See Millett v. Slocum, 4 A.D.2d 528, 167 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1957), affd, 5 N.Y.2d 734,
152 N.E.2d 672, 177 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1958).
113. Augustine, supra note 67, at 2101.
added).
115. The limited partners' concern over the security of their investment is analogous
to a creditor's concern over the selection of parties to whom credit will be extended. See
Note, supra note 75, at 295.
116. Id.
117. ULPA § 9(1) provides:
A general partner shall have all the rights and powers and be subject to all the restric-
tions and liabilities of a partner in a partnership without limited partners, except that
without the written consent or ratification of the specific act by all the limited part-
ners, a general partner or all of the general partners have no authority to ...
(e) [a]dmit a person as a general partner, (f) [a]dmit a person as a limited partner,
unless the right to do so is given in the certificate, (g) [c]ontinue the business with
partnership property on the death, retirement or insanity of a general partner, unless
the right to do so is given in the certificate.
See also ULPA §§ 20, 24.
118. The drafters designed the UPLA to promote capital investments by granting
investors limited liability and permitting investors sufficient control to protect their invest-
ments. Analyzing managerial performance and correcting discovered deficiencies is the
"quintessence of protecting one's investment." Note, supra note 75, at 295.
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tive voice in determining the identity of the general partner.
Section 10 of the ULPA 9 grants other rights to limited part-
ners that are comparable to their general partner removal powers.
Section 10 recognizes a limited partner's right of access to partner-
ship information. 120 Courts have indicated that in extraordinary
situations limited partners may respond to the information they
acquire by taking actions necessary to protect their investments
without incurring general liability. 2' Therefore, the power to re-
move a general partner complements the limited partners' infor-
mation rights. 22 Furthermore, a contrary conclusion exposing lim-
ited partners to unlimited liability would deny investors the means
to protect and secure their investment short of dissolving the part-
nership.1 23 Additionally, the limited partners' right to seek dissolu-
tion and liquidation is analogous to their right to remove a sole
general partner 12 because, similar to a situation in which the part-
nership agreement fails to provide for a substitute general part-
ner,125 the limited partnership dissolves if none of its members ac-
cept general liability.126
119. ULPA § 10(1) provides:
A limited partner shall have the same rights as a general partner to (a) [hiave the
partnership books kept at the principal place of business of the partnership, and at all
times to inspect and copy any of them, (b) [h]ave on demand true and full information
of all things affecting the partnership, and a formal account of partnership affairs
whenever circumstances render it just and reasonable, and (c) [h]ave dissolution and
winding up by decree of court.
120. Id.
121. See Weil v. Diversified Properties, 319 F. Supp. 778 (D.D.C. 1970) (allowing a
limited partner to hire and confer with business managers when the general partner
renounces his salary and managerial responsibilities).
122. See Note, supra note 75, at 296. Removal rights complement other rights inher-
ent in limited partner status without violating the "control" prohibition of ULPA § 7.
123. ULPA § 10(1)(c) grants limited partners the right to seek judicial dissolution of
the partnership. See infra note 124 and accompanying text. Dissolution by court decree is
not exclusive. Therefore, the partnership agreement may grant limited partners the right to
dissolve the partnership. See Roulac, supra note 8, at 294.
124. Augustine, supra note 67, at 2102. Even after a particular limited partnership is
dissolved, the participants still may reconstitute with a new general partner.
125. ULPA § 20 states that "[tihe retirement, death, or insanity of a general partner
dissolves the partnership, unless the business is continued by the remaining general part-
ners (a) [u]nder a right to do so stated in the certificate, or (b) [w]ith the consent of all
members." Logically, if the partnership agreement provides for a successor general partner
upon removal of the original general partner, dissolution of the partnership due to removal
of the sole general partner can be avoided. See infra notes 246-48 and accompanying text;
see also Betz v. Chena Hot Springs Group, 657 P.2d 831 (Alaska 1982) (finding that amend-
ment to partnership agreement providing for continuance vote illustrated parties' intent to
continue partnership upon involuntary retirement of general partner).
126. See In re Harms, 10 Bankr. 817 (D. Colo. 1981) (dissolving limited partnership
without a general partner).
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While dissolution provided an adequate remedy prior to pas-
sage of uniform legislation, 27 the size and structure of modern lim-
ited partnerships often render dissolution an inappropriate rem-
edy.128  Limited partners who seek judicial dissolution and
liquidation of the partnership may produce a more harmful result
than a general partner guilty of fraud or mismanagement. Because
of the time constraints and decreased bargaining power inherent in
forced sales, limited partners may realize a less favorable return on
their investment.'29 Furthermore, dissolution may result in sub-
stantial tax liabilities for the limited partnership, including the re-
alization of gain on outstanding nonrecourse loans and cash re-
ceived.130  Upon dissolution, limited partners receive a
proportionate share of the partnership's outstanding nonrecourse
debts and cash; therefore, the limited partners may be taxed on
gains yielded if they previously took large depreciation deductions
to reduce their bases.1 3 ' Thus, limited partners should seek judicial
dissolution only when the harm resulting from the general part-
ner's misconduct substantially outweighs the deprivation of either
a greater return on their investment or income tax benefits.
Removal of a general partner is far less disruptive to a limited
partnership's business than judicial dissolution. 32 Removal allevi-
ates the unreasonable requirement of forcing limited partners to
terminate their investments to protect against a general partner's
fraud or mismanagement. If limited partners possess a right of re-
moval and if the partnership agreement provides for a successor
general partner and continuation of the partnership, then the lim-
ited partners may retain their investments in addition to receiving
protection from mismanagement. By exercising their power to re-
move a general partner, limited partners can avoid a reduction in
the return on their partnership interest and the attendant loss of
127. When partnerships were primarily small organizations with personal relationships
among the members, courts were reluctant to interfere in the essentially private relation-
ships and preferred terminating the common association. See Note, supra note 55, at 779.
128. Modern limited partnerships often involve hundreds of limited partners who re-
quire protection from the general partners' mismanagement. See Hecker, supra note 37, at
344; Note, supra note 55, 779. Dissolving a large limited partnership would be costly to the
business and to the limited partners.
129. See Note, supra note 55, at 779.
130. Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding that taxpayer realized gain on sale of
property subject to non-recourse mortgage).
131. See generally Note, supra note 55, at 780-83.
132. With judicial dissolution, the partnership may continue to exist only until wind-
ing up its existing business. See CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 4, § 90B, at 518-519 and
n.22.
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tax benefits.
Section 9(1)(g) of the ULPA 3s allows the limited partnership
to continue transacting business with a remaining general partner
following the death, retirement, or insanity of another general
partner if the partnership agreement so provides or if the limited
partners unanimously agree to a continuation.1 3 4 Section 9(1)(g)
acknowledges the importance of the limited partners' approval
concerning continuation of the business when the identities of the
general partners have changed. Granting limited partners the right
to remove a general partner and to continue the business with an-
other existing general partner produces the same circumstantial re-
sult as section 9(1)(g). Furthermore, permitting the business to
continue with a substitute general partner enables the limited
partners to protect their investments without resorting to
dissolution.1 3 5
2. The Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act
Similar to the ULPA, the RULPA does not explicitly grant
limited partners the right to remove general partners. The
RULPA, however, grants limited partners specific rights that are
analagous to the right of removal. For example, section 401136 of
133. For the actual language of ULPA § 9(1)(g), see supra note 117.
134. A provision in the partnership agreement allowing a simple majority of the
limited partners to elect a general partner and continue the business should not be objec-
tionable because the limited partners agreed to the provision upon entering the agreement.
Augustine, supra note 67, at 2102; see infra notes 253-54 and accompanying text. At least
one court, however, has held that a condition agreed to in advance does not necessarily
constitute the "written consent. . . of the specific act" required by ULPA § 9(1). Newbur-
ger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365 F. Supp. 1369 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding the language of section
9(1)(b) to be absolute and not subject to variation by the partnership agreement and, there-
fore, requiring a unanimous vote of the partners prior to the transfer of partnership assets
to a successor corporation).
135. The limited partners' right to remove a general partner and to continue the busi-
ness with a substitute general partner affects the partnership in the same way as the limited
partners' exercise of their 9(1)(g) rights because both permit the partnership business to be
continued by the remaining general partners upon the death, retirement, or insanity of a
general partner with the limited partners unanimous consent. See supra note 125 and
accompanying text; infra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
136. RULPA § 401 provides that "[aifter the filing of a limited partnership's original
certificate of limited partnership, additional general partners may be admitted only with the
specific written consent of each partner." But see Basile, Admission of Additional and Sub-
stitute General Partners to a Limited Partnership: A Proposal for Freedom of Contract,
1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 235 (arguing that the contemporaneous consent rule for the admission of
additional and substitute general partners should be repealed); 1985 ULPA § 401 (permit-
ting partnership certificate to provide for admission of general partners upon less than
unanimous vote of limited partners).
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the RULPA, like section 9(1)(e)' 37 of the ULPA, requires the lim-
ited partners' unanimous approval as a condition precedent to the
admission of a new general partner. The RULPA's drafters in-
tended to provide limited partners with a method for controlling
changes in the partnership's management. 138 The power to remove
a general partner furthers this intent by providing limited partners
with a related mechanism for instituting managerial change and
protecting their investment.
In several areas, however, the RULPA considerably expands
the removal power implicit in the ULPA. For instance, RULPA
section 303(b) permits the partnership agreement to grant, and
limited partners to exercise, specific voting rights. 3 9 Enumerated
statutory voting rights include the limited partners' right to re-
move a general partner. 140 Additionally, section 402 provides for
cessation of the general partner's agency status if he is removed in
accordance with the partnership agreement.1 4' Although the
RULPA does not explicitly grant limited partners the right to re-
move a general partner, its provisions establish that the "general
partner's agency relationship is terminable at will". 4 2
Unlike the ULPA, the RULPA enables the limited partners to
remove a sole general partner without causing dissolution of the
limited partnership. 4 3 Under the ULPA, if the removed general
partner is also the sole general partner, then dissolution will occur
automatically. If, however, the removed general partner is not the
sole general partner and the partnership agreement specifically au-
thorizes continuation under direction of the remaining general
partners, then the limited partnership is sustained.' 44 To avoid dis-
solution, the RULPA permits the limited partners to remove the
sole general partner, continue the business, and appoint one or
137. ULPA § 9(1)(e) states that general partners have no authority to "[a]dmit a
person as a general partner" without the unanimous consent of the limited partners.
138. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
139. Note that the 1985 ULPA expands the voting rights of § 303(b) significantly. See
1985 ULPA § 303(b)(6).
140. RULPA § 303(b)(5)(v); 1985 ULPA § 303(b)(6)(v).
141. See also 1985 ULPA § 402(3). RULPA § 402(3) provides that a person ceases to
be a general partner in a limited partnership if "the general partner is removed as a general
partner in accordance with the partnership agreement."
142. RULPA § 402, official comment. The RULPA's drafters further noted that
removal of the general partner might "result in a breach of the partnership agreement giv-
ing rise to an action for damages."
143. RULPA § 801(3); 1985 ULPA § 801(4); see infra note 147.
144. ULPA § 20; see supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
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more additional general partners. 14 5 RULPA section 801(3)1" gives
the limited partners a ninety day grace period during which to
unanimously agree, in writing, to continue the business and to ap-
point one or more substitute general partners.147 The section
801(3) grace period, coupled with the inclusion of removal voting
rights in section 303(b) and the explicit recognition in section 402
that the general partner's agency relationship terminates at will,
affirms the limited partners' right to remove general partners
under the RULPA.
C. State Securities Regulations
By definition, limited partnerships are securities because the
limited partners cannot participate in management of the partner-
ship's business.148 Thus, limited partners are considered quasi-
stockholders.149 Section 18 of the Securities Act of 1933 specifically
preserves the states' right to regulate the offering, sale, and distri-
bution of securities. 5 0 Similar to the federal securities laws, state
blue-sky laws 151 require disclosure and dissemination of informa-
145. RULPA § 801(3); 1985 ULPA § 801(4); see Basile, supra note 136, at 244.
146. Section 801(3) provides for dissolution of the limited partnership upon:
withdrawal of a general partner unless at the time there is at least one other general
partner and the certificate of limited partnership permits the business of the limited
partnership to be carried on by the remaining general partner and that partner does so,
but the limited partnership is not dissolved and is not required to be wound up by
reason of any event of withdrawal if, within 90 days after withdrawal, all partners agree
in writing to continue the business of the limited partnership and to the appointment
of one or more additional general partners if necessary or desired ....
See also 1895 ULPA § 801(4). Removal of a general partner constitutes an "event of with-
drawal." RULPA §§ 101(3), 402(3); 1985 ULPA §§ 101(3), 402(3).
147. But see Lovell v. Hallelujah, Inc., 451 So. 2d 116 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (construing
Louisiana partnership law). In Lovell the court rejected the provisions of RULPA § 801(3)
because it "would require a limbo period at least until an additional general partner is ap-
pointed, where the firm would either be without management or the limited partners would
be held liable as general partners." Id. at 121. Instead, the court held that "the departure of
all general partners results in dissolution." Id.; see Comment, An Examination of Louisiana
Limited Partnership-The Partnership In Commendam, 55 TUL. L. REv. 515, 540 (1981).
148. See, e.g., Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1227-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd 553
F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that because limited partners must, by statute, rely solely
on the efforts of others for their profit, their limited partnership interest is a security);
Stowell v. Ted S. Finkel Invs. Servs., Inc. [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) % 98,321 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (holding that the right to replace a general partner does not
affect the securities status of a limited partnership interest).
149. Boyle & Sommer, Securities Law Aspects of Partnerships in RESOURCE MATERI-
ALs-PARTNERSHIPS: UPA, ULPA, SECURITIES, TAXATION, AND BANKRUPTCY 456-57 (5th ed.
1994).
150. Securities Act of 1933, § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1982).
151. Kansas enacted the first state securities law in 1911 to protect investors from
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tion concerning securities through a registration process. 152 In 1956
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
promulgated the Uniform Securities Act. More than thirty states
have subsequently adopted specific provisions of this Act.153 In ad-
dition, state regulating agencies formed the North American Se-
curities Administrators Association "to coordinate state securities
laws and to adopt joint policies and guidelines in connection with
securities offerings.' 154 Finally, the Midwest Securities Commis-
sioners Association, also composed of state securities regulators, re-
leases policy statements and guidelines that member states may
choose to adopt.155 Promoters who register offerings in the form of
a limited partnership with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion and state securities administrators must comply with guide-
lines and regulations adopted by the various states.
156
The number of large, public limited partnerships has in-
creased dramatically in recent years, in part due to the various tax
shelter benefits inuring to investors. 57 This rapid expansion, cou-
pled with reports of general partners' mismanagement and self-
dealing, Ss prompted some states' securities administrators to pro-
mulgate rules, guidelines, and regulations to eliminate problems
presented by public limited partnerships. 59 These state securities
"speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of 'blue sky'." Hall v.
Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917). Hence, state securities statutes are labeled "blue
sky laws."
152. See Limited Partnerships-Recent Developments: Securities, Tax, and Substan-
tive Partnership Law Issues, 39 Bus. LAW. 677, 687 (1984) [hereinafter Recent Develop-
ments]. Exemptions from state and federal registration requirements are available. See gen-
erally id. at 689-92.
153. See D. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION IN A NUTSHELL § 44, at 302-03 (2d ed.
1982).
154. Recent Developments, supra note 152, at 687. The North American Securities
Administrators Association is hereinafter referred to as the NASAA.
155. Note, supra note 55, at 780 n.86. Twenty-four states comprise the Midwest
Securities Commissioners' Association [hereinafter MSCA]. Roulac, supra note 8, at 279
n.45.
156. See, e.g., CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, R.260.140.116.2, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
1 11,999 (Oct. 1985); Mo. ADMIN. CODE § 30-152.180, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) T 35,468
(June 1986); TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit 7 § 117.7, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 55,607 (June
1986). These statutes require partnership agreements to provide for the removal of general
partners, election of new general partners, and fair methods of valuation and payment for
the removed general partner's share.
157. Hecker, supra note 34, at 58. Investment in publicly registered limited partner-
ships exceeded $8.2 billion in 1984. News Report, supra note 4, at 31.
158. See e.g., Executive Hotel Assocs. v. Elm Hotel Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 354, 245
N.Y.S.2d 929 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.), affd mem., 43 Misc. 2d 153, 250 N.Y.S.2d 351 (N.Y. App.
Term 1964); Hecker, supra note 34, at 58-59.
159. See e.g., MSCA Statement of Policy Regarding Real Estate Programs (adopted
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administrators sought to provide limited partners with a measure
of control over the management of the limited partnership, thereby
enabling them to protect their investments from general partners'
abusive actions.160 To achieve this objective, some state regulations
require that the partnership agreement grant a majority of the out-
standing limited partnership interests specific rights, including the
right to amend the partnership agreement, dissolve the partner-
ship, remove a general partner, and elect a substitute general part-
ner.16' These requirements potentially conflict with the ULPA's
provision that limited partners cannot participate in the partner-
ship's management without incurring unlimited personal liabil-
ity.18e Thus, compliance with state securities guidelines could jeop-
ardize the limited partners' status as limited partners and expose
them to general liability.
In accord with the guidelines promulgated by their state se-
curities administrators, several states have amended their partner-
ship statutes so that the possession or exercise of specified voting
rights will not constitute managerial control of the partnership.16
Potential problems still exist, however, because many states have
failed to amend their partnership statutes, thus raising choice of
law problems."6 The RULPA drafters attempted to alleviate this
on Feb. 28, 1973; amended on Feb. 26, 1974 and July 22, 1975; adopted by the NASAA on
April 15, 1980), reprinted in [1980 Transfer Binder] 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 4821;
NASAA Guidelines for the Registration of Oil and Gas Programs (adopted Sept. 22, 1976;
amended Oct. 12, 1977 and Oct. 31, 1979), reprinted in [1980 Transfer Binder] 1 BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) 1 4582.
160. See Hecker, supra note 34, at 59; Note, supra note 75, at 290.
161. See supra note 159.
162. See ULPA § 7. See generally Note, supra note 75, at 290-96.
163. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 15507 (1977 & West Supp. 1986); see also Hecker,
supra note 34, at 59.
164. If a limited partnership "organized in a state authorizing such voting rights had
contacts in a state not having such statutory authority and suit was brought in the latter
jurisdiction, the possibility always existed that the forum state's choice of law rules would
dictate application of its own version of [ULPA] section 7." Hecker, supra note 34, at 59.
See generally Augustine, supra note 67, at 2089-99 (discussing choice of law problem). Fur-
thermore, some states' blue sky laws include an introductory phase that raises conflict of
law questions. For example, the Florida regulation, which mandates limited partner voting
rights in real estate limited partnerships, provides in pertinent part: "[t]o the extent that
the law of the state in question is not inconsistent, the limited partnership agreement must
provide that a majority of the then outstanding limited partnership interests may, without
the necessity of concurrence by the general partner(s), vote to . . . (3) remove the general
partner(s) [and] elect a new general sponsor .... FLA ADMIN. CODE ch. 3E-100, R. 3E-
700.06(2)(b)(3), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) T 17,476 (1983) (emphasis added). Commentators
have noted that this rule may require giving limited partners these powers even if the for-
mation state's law prohibits the grant and even though the exercise of these powers could
result in the loss of limited liability. Coleman & Weatherbie, supra note 6, at 898 & n.87. A
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quandry by specifically authorizing voting rights for limited part-
ners and by providing that possession and exercise of these rights
will not amount to control over partnership management. 165
RULPA section 303(b) not only solves the conflict between state
securities regulations and partnership laws, but also recognizes the
right of limited partners to control fundamental changes in the
structure of the limited partnership. This right to control struc-
tural changes in the partnership differs greatly from daily partici-
pation in partnership business.166 Blue sky regulations that require
the partnership agreement to provide for a general partner's re-
moval and for appointment of a successor general partner by a ma-
jority vote by the limited partners effectuate the investor supervi-
sion policy underlying the RULPA.167
III. COLLATERAL EFFECTS OF REMOVAL
Whether the removal provision is mandated by state blue sky
laws or is included in the partnership agreement as a result of the
parties' negotiations, exercise of the removal provision produces a
myriad of changes in the legal and financial relationship among the
parties and in the basic structure of the partnership itself. For ex-
ample, questions arise concerning whether the removal of a general
partner forces the parties to recognize gain or loss as a result of the
conversion of partnership interests and whether removal alters the
tax classification of the limited partnership. Removal of a general
partner also may expose the limited partners to unlimited personal
liability or jeopardize outstanding partnership contracts with third
parties. Practitioners should consider these and other collateral ef-
fects of removal when drafting a partnership agreement and when
advising clients about limited partnerships.
similar California statute regulating oil and gas limited partnerships clarifies the applicabil-
ity of the rule mandating limited partner voting rights by providing, "[t]o the extent the law
of the state of organization is not inconsistent." Id. R. 260.140.128.2, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) 12,052 (1984).
165. RULPA § 303, official comment; see also 1985 ULPA § 303.
166. See In re Overthrust Mineral Corp., [1982-1984 Decisions Transfer Binder] BLUE
SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 71,849, at 70,094-95 (Wyo. Sec. of State, No. 5-394, July 25, 1983)
(reconciling RULPA § 303(b)(5) with the NASAA's requirement that the partnership agree-
ment include removal provisions); Hecker, supra note 34, at 59.
167. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
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A. Tax Implications of Removal
Limited partnerships have experienced tremendous growth as
investment vehicles primarily because of the tax advantages associ-
ated with the pass-through concept.10 8 The pass-through concept
requires individual partners to recognize the limited partnership's
profits or losses on their personal tax returns. 1 9 Under the pass-
through concept, limited partners can "shelter" their own income
by deducting, on their personal tax returns, their proportionate
share of partnership losses up to the amount of their adjusted ba-
sis.170 A limited partner's adjusted basis consists of his capital con-
tribution and his proportionate share of partnership liabilities.17' If
the partnership agreement's removal provision converts the re-
moved general partner's partnership interest into a limited part-
nership interest, then questions arise over whether the conversion
is a taxable event. Additionally, the right to remove a general part-
ner may affect the tax status of the organization as a limited
partnership.
168. 3 A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL & P. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION B-1 (3d ed.
1981). Note, however, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 limits the deduction of losses and credits
from income generated by passive activities that include "trade or business activities in
which the taxpayer (or spouse) does not materially participate (i.e., is not involved on a
regular, continuous, and substantial basis)." H.R. Rep. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., The
Tax Reform Act of 1986: Conference Committee Report, at 11-137 (P-H 1986). Passive
income can be offset only by losses generated by passive activities. Id. Similarly, taxes paya-
ble on passive income can be reduced only by tax credits from passive activities. Id. Thus,
because limited partners are "precluded from materially participating in the partnership's
activities, losses and credits attributable to the limited partnership's activities are generally
treated as from passive activities." Id. at 11-145. Under the passive loss rule, however, sus-
pended deductions with respect to any activities of the limited partnership are allowed on
the taxpayer's disposition of his entire interest in the limited partnership because "it
becomes possible at that time to measure the taxpayer's actual gain or loss from the activ-
ity." Id.
169. See generally Note, Income Tax Treatment of Shifts in Partnership Profit and
Loss Interests, 1984 DuKE L.J. 805 (discussing the "flip-flop" method of structuring partner-
ships to enable partners to allocate profits and losses for a predetermined period of time).
170. I.R.C. § 704(d) (1982). Section 704(d) further provides that "[a]ny excess of such
loss over such basis shall be allowed as a deduction at the end of the partnership year in
which such excess is repaid to the partnership." But see supra note 168 (regarding passive
loss rule contained in the Tax Reform Act of 1986).
171. See I.R.C. §§ 722, 752. A limited partner also may increase his basis by the
amount of his proportionate share in the partnership's nonrecourse loans. Id. § 752(c);
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
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1. Tax Consequences of Converting a General Partnership
Interest
In Revenue Ruling 84-52172 the Internal Revenue Service con-
sidered the tax consequences of converting a general partnership
interest into a limited partnership interest. 173 Section 741 of the
Internal Revenue Code provides that realization of gain or loss
must be recognized upon the sale or exchange of a partnership in-
terest. 17 4 Likewise, section 1001 of the Code requires that the en-
tire amount of a gain or loss realized from the sale or other disposi-
tion of property be recognized, unless another Code section under
subtitle A provides for nonrecognition. l 6 Code section 721, how-
ever, provides that no gain or loss is recognized by a partnership or
its partners when property is contributed to the partnership in ex-
change for an interest therein. 7 6 In Revenue Ruling 84-52 the Ser-
vice determined that, pursuant to section 721, no gain or loss
would be recognized under sections 741 or 1001 as a result of the
conversion of a general partnership interest into a limited partner-
ship interest in the same partnership. 7 Even though the conver-
sion constitutes an "exchange," if the partners each retain their
respective percentage interest in partnership profits, losses, and
capital, then they will not recognize gain or loss under Section
721. 17 If, however, a partner's share of the liabilities decreases, the
decrease will be treated as a distribution of cash by the partner-
ship and will result in a decrease of the partner's basis.'79 In addi-
tion, the Service held that the conversion is not considered a "sale
or exchange" under section 708's termination provision. 80 Thus,
172. Rev. Rul. 84-52, 1984-1 C.B. 157.
173. A general partnership, consisting of four general partners with equal interests in
the partnership, proposed to amend the partnership agreement to convert the general part-
nership into a limited partnership under the ULPA. Each partner's total percentage interest
in the partnership's profits, losses, and capital remained the same upon conversion, but two
of the four partners assumed limited partner status. The partnership's business continued
after the conversion. Id.
174. I.R.C. § 741 (1982); see also id.
175. I.R.C. § 1001 (1982); see also Rev. Rul. 84-52, 1984-1 C.B. 157.
176. I.R.C. § 721 (1982); see also Rev. Rul. 84-52, 1984-1 C.B. 157.
177. Rev. Rul. 84-52, 1984-1 C.B. 157. Although the ruling deals with a limited part-
nership formed under the ULPA, at least one commentator has noted that "the ruling's
underlying rationale that a partnership conversion constitutes a tax-free sale or exchange of
a partnership interest should apply equally to partnerships formed under the [RULPA]."
Banoff, In New Revenue Ruling 84-52, the IRS Uses an "Exchange" Approach to Conver-
sions, 61 J. TAX'N 98, 99 (1984).
178. Rev. Rul. 84-52, 1984-1 C.B. 157 I.R.B. 16, 16-17.
179. Id. at 158; see also LR.C. § 752(b) (1982).
180. Rev. Rul. 84-52, 1984-1 C.B. 158. In Revenue Ruling 84-52 the partnership was
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the removed general partner who converts his general partnership
interest into a limited partnership interest does not recognize gain
or loss.
2. Effects of Removal on the Taxation Status of the Limited
Partnership
Generally, the tax consequences of a limited partnership are
similar to those of a general partnership; the partners recognize
their proportionate share of certain income'"' and deductions to
the extent of their basis.'82 A limited partnership qualifies for part-
nership tax status if it lacks a predominance of corporate charac-
teristics.'83 These corporate characteristics include continuity of
life,' 84 centralization of management,' 5 limited liability,'8 6 and free
transferability of interests. 87 If these characteristics predominate,
the limited partnership will be characterized as an "association,"' 88
subject to taxation as a corporation.
(a) Continuity of Life
Lack of continuity of life is a favorable factor in allowing lim-
ited partnerships to avoid corporate taxation. Under the current
tax regulations, a limited partnership lacks continuity of life if the
general partner's retirement, death, or insanity causes dissolution
of the partnership "unless the remaining general partners agree to
continue the partnership or unless all remaining members agree to
continue the partnership."'8 s9 Limited partnerships also lack con-
tinuity of life if the partnership agreement provides that the lim-
not terminated for tax purposes under § 708 because the business was to continue after the
conversion. Also, a transaction governed by § 721 is not treated as a sale or exchange for
purposes of section 708. Banoff, supra note 177, at 99.
181. I.R.C. § 702(a) (1982).
182. Id. § 752; Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1986). But see supra note 168 (regarding
passive loss rule contained in the Tax Reform Act of 1986).
183. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1986).
184. Id. § 301.7701-2(b); see infra notes 189-96 and accompanying text.
185. Id. § 301.7701-2(c); see infra notes 197-207 and accompanying text.
186. Id. § 301.7701-2(d); see infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
187. Id. § 301.7701-2(e),-3(b)(2); see infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
188. An "association" is defined as "an organization whose characteristics require it to
be classified for purposes of taxation as a corporation rather than as another type of organi-
zation such as a partnership or a trust." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1).
189. Id. § 301.7701-2(b)(1); see Glensder Textile Co. v. Comm'r, 46 B.TA. 176 (1942).
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(3) states that a limited partnership "subject to a statute corre-
sponding to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act" lacks continuity of life. Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(a)(5) extends this conclusion to the RULPA.
1986] 1439
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1407
ited partnership can be terminated at will by any member. 190
The policy of investor supervision underlying state partner-
ship law clashed with the prohibition against continuity of life191 in
1973 when California amended its version of the ULPA. The Cali-
fornia amendment provided for advance consent to the continua-
tion of the partnership upon certain events and granted limited
partners specific voting rights, including the removal and election
of general partners by majority vote.192 The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, in 1973, determined that partnerships formed under the Cali-
fornia ULPA did not lack continuity of life because the
majoritarian provisions permitted advance consent to the partner-
ship's continuation and because the partnership could not be ter-
minated at will by a general partner.193 The California ULPA was
subsequently amended to conform with section 20 of the ULPA.19 4
In Revenue Ruling 84-80,195 however, the Service conceded that
limited partnerships that are organized under versions of the
RULPA permitting partnership agreements to contain both
majoritarian general partner removal and election provisions and
an advance consent to the admission of additional or substitute
general partners provision lack the corporate characteristic of con-
tinuity of life.19
190. If the partnership agreement provides that the partnership "is to continue for a
stated period or until the completion of a stated transaction," the partnership has
continuity of life because no member has the power to dissolve the limited partnership in
contravention of the agreement. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(3).
191. See Buxbaum, supra note 4, at 14.
192, CAL. CORP. CODE § 15520(a), (b) (West 1955). Under the ULPA, the partnership
dissolves upon the retirement, death, or insanity of a general partner unless the business is
continued by the remaining general partners in accordance with the partnership certificate
or with the consent of all partners. ULPA § 20. The California ULPA allowed limited part-
nerships to be continued "by the remaining general partners and/or the general partner or
partners elected in place thereof, provided the right is spelled out in the certificate." CAL.
CORP. CODE § 15520(a) (West 1955). Furthermore, voting rights granted by the California
ULPA enabled the limited partners to elect a new general partner and perpetuate the
limited partnership. See id. § 15520(b); Roulac, supra note 8, at 284.
193. The Internal Revenue Service [hereinafter IRS] issued a "private" release that
provided technical advice on the formation of limited partnerships under the California
ULPA. Roulac, supra note 8, at 285.
194. The California ULPA was amended on Oct. 5, 1973 to conform to ULPA § 20.
See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15520.5 (West Supp. 1976). Subsequently, the IRS issued a revenue
ruling which noted that the amendment to the California ULPA corrected the continuity of
life problem. Rev. Rul. 74-320, 1974-2 C.B. 404.
195. Rev. Rul. 84-80, 1984-1 C.B. 275.
196. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15632, 15636, 15641 (West Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 17-401 (Supp. 1984). Partnerships formed under the RULPA do not have continuity
of life due to the provisions of section 801. See RULPA § 801(3); see generally Basile, supra
note 136, at 237-55.
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(b) Centralization of Management
Another criteria used in determining the tax treatment of lim-
ited partnerships is whether the organization has centralized man-
agement. Centralized management is defined as "a concentration
of continuing exclusive authority to make independent business
decisions on behalf of the organization [without] ratification by
members of such organization. ' 197 At first glance, limited partner-
ships appear to fit this definition because general partners exercise
their authority on behalf of the limited partners.""8 General part-
ners, however, also act for their own benefit and not exclusively as
representatives of the limited partners. 199 Therefore, centralization
of management does not seem to exist. The treasury regulations
recognize that limited partnerships subject to the uniform statutes
generally do not have centralized management;20 0 if, however, lim-
ited partners own all or substantially all of the partnership inter-
ests, then centralized management exists.201 Thus, if the general
partners lack substantial interests, they are assumed to be manag-
ers for the limited partners and the limited partnership possesses
centralized management.20 2
Granting limited partners the right to remove a general part-
ner affects the presence or absence of centralized management.203
Treasury Department regulations provide that if the limited part-
ners have the power to remove a general partner, then the determi-
nation of whether a limited partnership has centralized manage-
ment will turn on the attendant circumstances. 204 The regulations,
however, note that "a substantially restricted right of the limited
partners to remove the general partner" would not cause the exis-
tence of centralized management. 205 According to the regulations,
the limited partners' right to remove a general partner because of
197. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(3).
198. See Haims & Strock, supra note 7, at 499.
199. Id. The authors note that the agency relationship between limited and general
partners, incorporated in the ULPA and RULPA, prevents the recognition of centralized
management. See ULPA § 9; RULPA § 403.
200. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4).
201. Id. See Willis, Optional Adjustments to Basis of Partnership Properties under
Section 743(b) and 734(b) in RESOURCE MATERIALS-PARTNERSHIPS: UPA, ULPA, SECURI-
TIES, TA XATION, AND BANKRUPTCY 184 (1st ed. 1978) (stating that the IRS' rule-of-thumb is
an 80-20 percent substantiality test); Larson v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 159 (1976).
202. See Haims & Strock, supra note 7, at 499-500.
203. See T.D. 7889, 48 Fed. Reg. 18,805 (1983) (codified at 26 C.F.R. 301.7702 (1986)).
204. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4).
205. Id.
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gross negligence, self-dealing, or embezzlement constitutes a "sub-
stantially restricted right."20 6 This limitation on the limited part-
ners' right of removal illustrates the belief that an unrestricted
right to remove general partners would indicate that the general
partner is merely managing the limited partnership on behalf of
the limited partners and not for his own benefit.207 Consequently,
the partnership would possess centralized management. °8
(c) Limited Liability
A partnership will have limited liability if no member of the
limited partnership is personally liable for the present and poten-
tial debts of the partnership.0 9 Ordinarily, the general partners
possess the requisite unlimited personal liability.210 The treasury
regulations, however, state that unlimited personal liability does
not exist if the general partners have no substantial assets outside
the partnership and if they are merely "strawmen" acting as the
limited partners' agents.211 Additionally, unlimited personal liabil-
ity is presumed absent if the partnership agreement provides that
the general partner maintains no personal liability to creditors for
partnership debts.212 Thus, removal provisions that demote a re-
moved general partner to passive limited partner status should not
grant the removed general partner protection against personal lia-
bility. Otherwise, the limited partnership may possess the corpo-
rate characteristic of limited liability and risk the loss of its limited
partnership tax status.
(d) Free Transferability of Interests
A limited partnership possesses the corporate characteristic of
free transferability of interests if each of its members, or those
owning all or substantially all of the partnership interests, "have
the power, without the consent of other members, to substitute for
themselves in the same organization a person who is not a member
206. Id.
207. T.D. 7889, 48 Fed. Reg. 18,804 (1983) (codified at 26 C.F.R. 301.7702 (1986)).
However, an unrestricted right of removal arguably indicates the absence of centralized
management. See Haims & Strock, supra note 7, at 504.
208. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1); see Comment, supra note 34, at 124.
209. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d).
210. Id. § 301.7701-2(d)(2). Unlimited personal liability exists if the general partners
are not mere "dummies" acting as agents for the limited partners, even if the general part-
ners lack substantial assets.
211. Id. This provision concerns debts for which no other general partner is liable.
212. Id. § 301.7701-2(e)(1).
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of the organization. '213 However, the characteristic of free transfer-
ability is absent if the partnership agreement authorizes partners
to assign only their right to share in the profits without the other
partners' consent, but not to assign their right to participate in the
organization's management.214 A removal provision, therefore, can
provide for the substitution of a new general partner upon removal
without risking corporate taxation of the organization.
B. Exposure of Limited Partners to General Liability
Under certain circumstances, removal of a general partner
could alter the status of the limited partners and expose them to
unlimited personal liability. The ULPA and the RULPA both re-
strict the limited partners' participation in the management of the
partnership.2 15 The limited partners' removal of a general partner
could modify the partnership's structure and, therefore, could vio-
late the uniform statutes' ambiguous restrictions on limited part-
ners' actions.
1. Limited Partner Control and Liability Under the ULPA
When limited partners invest in a limited partnership, they
expect their financial exposure to be limited to their capital contri-
bution. Under section 7 of the ULPA, however, limited liability
status depends on whether the limited partner refrains from
"tak[ing] part in the control of the business. 216 The ULPA, how-
ever, fails to define this phrase.21 7 The judiciary, therefore, has
been forced to define and interpret "control". The courts have em-
ployed primarily two tests to determine "control": the "power
test" and the "reliance" test.2 18 The "power" test focuses on the
organic structure of the limited partnership. If the partnership
agreement empowers limited partners to initiate and decide busi-
ness matters without the general partner's interference, the limited
partners' authority may constitute control and may result in the
loss of limited liability.219 However, the mere potential for control
213. See Haims & Strock, supra note 7, at 501.
214. See generally supra notes 197-207 and accompanying text.
215. ULPA § 7; RULPA § 303; see also 1985 ULPA § 303.
216. The official comments to ULPA § 7 fail to define "control." See Coleman &
Weatherbie, supra note 6, at 897.
217. See Coleman & Weatherbie, supra note 6, at 899; Roulac, supra note 8, at 283-85.
218. See CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 4, § 26, at 147; Coleman & Weatherbie,
supra note 6, at 899.
219. See Brodsky, Corporate and Securities Litigation-Shelter Litigation: Partici-
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may be insufficient to force unlimited liability on the limited part-
ners. Rather, limited partners may have to exercise actual control
to violate section 7.220 The "reliance" test focuses on whether the
limited partners' actions would cause creditors to reasonably rely
upon the apparent general liability of the limited partners.221 In
determining whether to impose unlimited personal liability on the
limited partners, courts should balance the limited partners' right
to supervise their investment against the creditor's right to assur-
ance of repayment.
The ULPA drafters required a general partner's existence to
resolve the policy conflict between the reliance interest of third
party creditors and the limited partners' interest in limited per-
sonal liability. When limited partners decide to remove a general
partner, the ULPA's policy equilibrium is disturbed and the "con-
trol" problem rears its ugly head. Limited partners' removal rights,
however, do not violate the control test because section 7's prohibi-
tion against limited partners' participation "in the control of the
business" contemplates operational actions in the partnership's
daily business, not the ability to influence structural changes.222
Furthermore, the courts have permitted extensive limited partner
participation in the partnership's day-to-day activities. For exam-
ple, in Plasteel Products Corp. v. Helman223 the court elected not
to impose general liability on the limited partners, even though
they selected a sales manager to assist the general partner in con-
trolling the finances of the business. Similarly, in Weil v. Diversi-
fied Properties224 the limited partners consulted with the partner-
ship's business manager about the operation of the business and,
yet, the court still held that these actions did not constitute partic-
ipation in control of the partnership.
Similarly, the limited partners' right of removal satisfies the
"reliance" test. First, if the general partner manages the partner-
pating in the Control of the Partnership, 176 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1976), cited in Coleman &
Weatherbie, supra note 6, at 899 n.91. No court has ever held that mere possession of power
to control violates section 7.
220. See Note, supra note 75, at 293. Logically, limited partners should be liable if
they hold themselves out to creditors as generally liable.
221. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
222. This proposition is supported by § 7's prohibition against limited partners con-
trolling the business of the partnership, rather than forbidding control over the partner-
ship's structure. See Augustine, supra note 67, at 2101.
223. 271 F.2d 354 (1st Cir. 1959).
224. 319 F. Supp. 778 (D.D.C. 1970). The court's holding addressed the issue of
whether the general partners could have the courts declare the limited partners generally
liable under section 7.
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ship profitably, the limited partners have no cause to remove him.
If, however, the general partner proves inadequate, either finan-
cially or managerially, creditors and limited partners share a mu-
tual economic concern that may be alleviated by removing the gen-
eral partner.225  The partnership's creditors would have an
increased fear of uncertainty of repayment only if the limited part-
ners remove the general partner and replace him with a
"strawman" lacking substantial assets. The case law, however, in-
dicates that general liability will be imposed on limited partners
when their actions induce creditors to rely on their personal assets
and promises to repay.226 In J. C. Wattenbargar & Sons v. Sand-
ers227 the limited partner personally guaranteed a loan to the lim-
ited partnership. The court denied summary judgment against the
defendant limited partner, emphasizing that the question of
whether the limited partner induced the creditor's reliance is a fact
question to be determined in light of the surrounding circum-
stances. 228 No cases directly address the relationship between re-
moval rights and their possible interference with creditor protec-
tion. If, however, the removal provision provides for substitution of
new management with substantially the same personal assets and
business experience as the removed general partner, then removal
would not threaten creditors. Thus, courts would have no reason,
at least under section 7's "reliance" test, to impose unlimited per-
sonal liability on the limited partners.
2. Limited Partner Control and Liability Under the RULPA
The RULPA's drafters attempted to clarify the inherent ambi-
guities of the ULPA's section 7 limitation on limited partners' par-
ticipation in the partnership business. 229 The RULPA supplies an
additional "safe harbor" that allows limited partners to participate
in certain activities without risking unlimited personal liability.
230
225. See Note, supra note 75, at 294-95.
226. See generally Coleman & Weatherbie, supra note 6, at 900 (discussing treatment
of third party reliance issues). The purpose of the ULPA is not to assist creditors nor to
induce creditors to extend credit under the mistaken belief that the limited partner is a
general partner and personally liable for repayment of partnership debts. Vulcan Furniture
Mfg. Corp. v. Vaughn, 168 So. 2d 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); accord Hoefer v. Hall, 75
N.M. 751, 411 P.2d 230 (1966) (holding that a limited partnership effectively limits the
liability of its limited partners to third parties to a fixed amount).
227. 191 Cal. App. 2d 857, 13 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1961).
228. Id. at 864-65, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 95-96.
229. RULPA § 303, official comment.
230. RULPA § 303(b).
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Section 303(b)(5)(v) provides that limited partners may vote to re-
move a general partner without assuming general liability. Thus,
this provision implicitly recognizes that removal of a general part-
ner is not equivalent to "taking control of the business. '23 1
The RULPA establishes a new standard permitting limited
partners greater participation in the partnership's business: "if the
limited partner's participation in the control of the business is not
substantially the same as the exercise of the powers of a general
partner, he is liable only to persons who transact business with the
limited partnership with actual knowledge of his participation in
control. 2 32 Under the "substantially the same" test, limited part-
ners risk unlimited personal liability only if they exercise authority
similar to that granted a general partner. Thus, the RULPA bal-
ances the competing policies of limited liability and investment su-
pervision desired by limited partners against the protection needs
of creditors.
Although the RULPA protects the limited partners' right to
remove a general partner, limited partners still may risk incurring
general liability if they assume the authority and power of the gen-
eral partner upon his removal.3 s If the limited partners assume
the authority and power of the removed, general partner prior to
the selection of a new business manager, courts may determine
that the limited partners' participation in the business is substan-
tially the same as the general partner's. Thus, removal provision
231. Section 303(b)(5) lists specific issues on which limited partners may vote without
risking unlimited liability. This list includes the limited partners' vote to remove a general
partner. In addition, the issues listed in § 303(b)(5) all relate to structural changes in the
partnership, such as the sale of all or substantially all of the partnership's assets and the
incurrence of a debt outside the usual course of business. Section 303(a), however, forbids
participation by the limited partners in the control of the business. Furthermore, § 303(a)
forbids limited partners from exercising powers that are "substantially the same" as those of
the general partners (i.e. managerial powers). Thus, in reading § 303 as a whole, the limited
partners' removal of a general partner does not constitute business participation, but rather
merely generates a structural alteration.
232. RULPA § 303(a). The first sentence in RULPA § 303(a) incorporates the "con-
trol" test of ULPA § 7 to ensure that the case law under the ULPA remains applicable to
the extent not expressly changed by the RULPA. RULPA § 303, official comment.
233. See RULPA § 303(c). Section 303(c) states that the limited partners' exercise of
any powers outside those listed in § 303(b) constitutes participation in the partnership's
business. For example, if the partnership agreement authorizes limited partners to strip the
general partner of his managerial powers and appoint a business manager, the courts may
determine that this exercise of authority is substantially the same as the authority granted
to a general partner. However, the limited partners in Plasteel Products Corp. v. Helman,
271 F.2d 354 (1st Cir. 1959), selected a business manager to assist in controlling the financial
dealings of the limited partnership and the court did not impose general liability on the
limited partners.
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drafters should insure that no lag time exists between removal of
the outgoing general partner and installation of a new general part-
ner because limited partners may lose their limited liability if
forced to assume the responsibilities of the removed general
partner.
3. Limited Partner Control and Liability Under the 1985 ULPA
Section 303(a) of the RULPA was amended in August 1985 by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
to rephrase the "control" rule, eliminate the "substantially the
same" test, and revise the standard of liability for limited part-
ners.234 The first sentence of 1985 ULPA section 303(a) places lia-
bility for partnership obligations on limited partners who "par-
ticipat[e] in the control of the business, "235 as opposed to "tak[e]
part in the control of the business" under the RULPA.2 36 Addi-
tionally, the second sentence of section 303(a) restricts the liability
of limited partners who participate in the control of the partner-
ship business to "persons who transact business with the limited
partnership reasonably believing, based upon the limited partner's
conduct, that the limited partner is a general partner. '237 Thus,
the "substantially the same" standard for liability was abandoned
by section 303(a) of the 1985 ULPA and the new "reasonable reli-
ance" test determines limited partners' liability to third parties.2 38
The Commissioners additionally amended section 303(b) to
expand the list of "safe harbor" activities in which limited partners
may participate without violating the control rule.2 8 Pursuant to
234. 1985 ULPA § 303(a). Although the Commissioner's comments to the new § 303
were not yet available in published form at the time of this writing, at least one commenta-
tor has asserted that the Commissioners intended the adoption of the new § 303 to relax the
control rule. See Basile, supra note 27, at 1214.
235. The first sentence of § 303(a) of the 1985 ULPA states: "[e]xcept as provided in
subsection (d), a limited partner is not liable for the obligations of a limited partnership
unless he [or she] is also a general partner or, in addition to the exercise of his [or her]
rights and powers as a limited partner, he [or she] participates in the control of the busi-
ness." (emphasis added).
236. Despite the change in § 303(a)'s language, the Commissioners likely did not in-
tend a substantive change in the control rule. See Basile, supra note 27, at 1214 & n.71
(asserting that the Commissioners changed the language in § 303(a) to "participate" merely
to achieve parallelism with the language of § 303(b)).
237. 1985 ULPA § 303(a).
238. See Basile, supra note 27, at 1214-15. The limited partnership statutes of both
California and Delaware employ a "reasonable reliance" test to determine if third parties
may bring suit against limited partners for participating in the control of the business. CAL.
CORP. CODE § 15632(a) (West Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 6, § 17-303(a) (Supp. 1984).
239. Section 303(b) provides:
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section 303(b)(6), limited partners may, by voting or otherwise, re-
move a general partner without fear of "participating in the con-
trol of the business" and, thus, possibly incurring unlimited per-
sonal liability.240 Whereas the original language of the RULPA
granted limited partners the right to vote on the removal of a gen-
eral partner, the 1985 ULPA permits the limited partners to pro-
pose, approve, or disapprove the removal of a general partner, by
voting or otherwise; clarifies the scope of the limited partners' re-
moval right; and protects them from sacrificing limited liability
upon the exercise of their right to remove a general partner.241
C. Effects of Removal on Limited Partnership Contracts
In their analysis of a limited partnership, creditors and lenders
look to the assets of the general partners because the general part-
ners are personally liable for all partnership debts. Creditors usu-
ally will not object if the limited partners remove an ineffective or
unsatisfactory general partner because removal should enhance the
partnership's ability to satisfy its debts. Lenders, however, often
insert acceleration clauses,242 which are triggered by the removal of
A limited partner does not participate in the control of the business within the mean-
ing of subsection (a) solely by doing one or more of the following: (1) being a contractor
for or an agent or employee of the limited partnership or of a general partner or being
an officer, director, or shareholder of a general partner that is a corporation; (2) con-
sulting with and advising a general partner with respect to the business of the limited
partnership; (3) acting as surety for the limited partnership or guaranteeing or assum-
ing one or more specific obligations of the limited partnership; (4) taking any action
required or permitted by law to bring or pursue a derivative action in the right of the
limited partnership; (5) requesting or attending a meeting of partners; (6) proposing,
approving, or disapproving, by voting or otherwise, one or more of the following mat-
ters: (i) the dissolution and winding up of the limited partnership; (ii) the sale, ex-
change, lease, mortgage, pledge, or other transfer of all or substantially all of the assets
of the limited partnership; (iii) the incurrence of indebtedness by the limited partner-
ship other than in the ordinary course of its business; (iv) a change in the nature of the
business; (v) the admission or removal of a general partner; (vi) the admission or
removal of a limited partner; (vii) a transaction involving an actual or potential conflict
of interest between a general partner and the limited partnership or the limited part-
ners; (viii) an amendment to the partnership agreement or certificate of limited part-
nership; or (ix) matters related to the business of the limited partnership not otherwise
enumerated in this subsection, which the partnership agreement states in writing may
be subject to the approval or disapproval of limited partners; (7) winding up the lim-
ited partnership pursuant to Section 803; or (8) exercising any right or power permitted
to limited partners under this [Act] and not specifically enumerated in this subsection.
1985 ULPA § 303(b).
240. 1985 ULPA § 303(b)(6)(v).
241. Compare RULPA § 303(b)(5)(v) with 1985 ULPA § 303(b)(6)(v).
242. An acceleration clause is "[a] provision or clause in a mortgage, note, bond, deed
of trust, or other credit agreement, which allows a lender the opportunity to call monies due
1448
INTRAPARTNERSHIP DISPUTES
a general partner or by the lender's "insecurity", in partnership
loan agreements. Therefore, a limited partnership's loans may be
accelerated either automatically upon removal of the general part-
ner or at the discretion of the lender if he deems himself to be
insecure following the removal. Thus, the limited partners' removal
powers present a double-edged sword. The threat of the partner-
ship's loans being accelerated realistically may preclude the limited
partners from removing a general partner despite his mismanage-
ment or fraudulent conduct.
Limited partners can avoid this "catch 22" by providing for a
substitute general partner in the partnership agreement 243 and by
submitting the substitute's financial and managerial credentials for
the lender's evaluation. If the limited partners select a substitute
general partner contemporaneously with the exercise of their re-
moval power and the lender approves the substitution, then the
lender would have little cause for insecurity. Thus, limited part-
ners could remove a general partner without jeopardizing the part-
nership's contracts with third parties.
IV. POST-REMOVAL ACTIONS OF PARTIES
The limited partners may desire to admit a substitute general
partner after removing a general partner.2 44 In fact, the limited
partners may be forced to make a substitution if they removed the
sole general partner. 4 5 To accomplish this, the remaining general
partners and the limited partners must comply with the applicable
statutory voting requirements, requirements that may call for ei-
ther a unanimous or majoritarian vote. The partners also should
consider indemnification of the removed and substitute general
partners and determine the removed general partner's compensa-
tion. Finally, an amendment outlining the partnership's structural
changes must be drafted, signed, and filed with the appropriate
under the instrument." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 12 (5th ed. 1979).
243. See infra notes 246-50 and accompanying text.
244. The admission of an additional general partner and the admission of a substitute
general partner are two conceptually different events. A hypothetical will illustrate the dis-
tinction more accurately. Assume a limited partnership includes two general partners. If
they desire three general partners, the admission of the third exemplifies the admission of
an additional general partner. In the alternative, if one of the two original general partners
is removed and the limited partners desire to replace the removed general partner, the addi-
tion of the second general partner illustrates the admission of a substitute general partner.
See Basile, supra note 136, at 237.
245. Limited partnerships, by definition, must have at least one general partner. See
supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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state official in accordance with state statutory requirements.
Once the general partner is removed as a matter of law, he
may decide to file suit against the limited partners for damages.
The general partner may attempt to establish one or more causes
of action. These actions might include tortious interference with a
contractual relationship, tortious interference with a business rela-
tionship, and tortious interference with an employment
relationship.
A. Admission of Substitute General Partners
1. Statutory Requirements for Admission
Neither the ULPA nor the RULPA specifically provides for
the admission of a substitute general partner into a limited part-
nership. ULPA section 9(1)(e) explicitly provides for the admission
of an additional general partner and implicitly permits the admis-
sion of a substitute general partner.2 46 Following the removal of a
general partner, the remaining general partners may desire or need
to admit a substitute general partner.247 Section 9(1) requires "the
written consent or ratification of the specific act [substitution of a
general partner] by all the limited partners." 24 8 Thus, unanimous
consent of the limited partners is required to effectuate the substi-
tution of a general partner.
Similarly, RULPA section 401 authorizes the admission of an
additional or substitute general partner "only with the specific
written consent of each partner. ' 249 Thus, the RULPA adopts the
ULPA's requirement of limited partner unanimity. The RULPA,
however, permits the admission of a substitute general partner fol-
lowing removal of the sole general partner to continue the partner-
ship business, 250 whereas the ULPA requires dissolution.
251
RULPA section 801(3) provides for the limited partnership's
dissolution upon "an event of withdrawal of a general partner,"
unless the certificate permits the continuation of partnership busi-
246. ULPA § 9(1)(e); see Basile, supra note 136, at 242.
247. Under the ULPA, the removal of a sole general partner results in dissolution. See
supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
248. ULPA § 9(1).
249. RULPA § 401. But see 1985 ULPA § 401 (permitting partnership agreement to
provide terms for admission).
250. The official comment explains that RULPA § 401 is derived from ULPA
§ 9(1)(e). Id.
251. ULPA § 20.
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ness and the partnership includes a new general partner.252 If the
certificate does not authorize the remaining general partners to
continue partnership business or if no remaining general partner
exists after the "event of withdrawal" of a general partner, then,
under section 801(3), the partners unanimously may agree, in writ-
ing and within ninety days, to continue business and to appoint
one or more substitute general partners.' An "event of with-
drawal" includes removal of a general partner.2 5 Upon removal of
a general partner, therefore, the remaining general partners and
the limited partners may appoint a substitute general partner and
continue the partnership business with or without the certificate's
express authorization. Furthermore, pursuant to section 801(3), the
limited partners may remove the sole general partner without dis-
solving the limited partnership if they admit a substitute general
partner.
In August 1985, however, the Commissioners amended section
401 of the RULPA and permitted parties to provide in advance the
terms for admission of additional or substitute general partners
into the partnership. 55 In the absence of a contrary provision in
the partnership agreement, section 401 mandates that the contem-
poraneous unanimous consent rule apply automatically.2 56 Thus,
the 1985 ULPA not only protects the parties' freedom of contract
with respect to voting requirements and procedures for the admis-
sion or substitution of general partners, but also permits advance,
rather than contemporaneous, consent to such an admission.2 57 In
essence, the 1985 ULPA aids limited partners who exercise their
right to remove a general partner by enabling them to agree in ad-
vance to the admission or substitution of a general partner upon
less than unanimous consent.
252. RULPA § 801(3); see 1985 ULPA § 801(4).
253. Several state partnership acts provide for advance, rather than contemporaneous,
consent to the admission of additional or substitute general partners. See, e.g., CAL. CORP.
CODE §§ 15632, 15636, 15641 (West Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 17-401 (Supp.
1984). Additionally, the IRS recently concluded that partnerships formed under statutes
that permit advance consent to the admission of additional or substitute general partners
lack continuity of life. Therefore, these partnerships qualify for partnership taxation. See
Rev. Rul. 84-80, 1984-1 C.B. 275.
254. RULPA § 801(3). For an analysis of § 801(3) and the "contemporaneous consent"
rule, see generally Basile, supra note 136, at 242-55.
255. RULPA §§ 101(3), 402(3); 1985 ULPA §§ 101(3), 402(3).
256. See Basile, supra note 136, at 253-54 (containing proposed RULPA amendment
to permit advance consent to admission or substitution of a general partner).
257. See Basile, supra note 136, at 253.
1986] 1451
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
2. Indemnification and Compensation of the Parties
Following a general partner's removal, the limited partners
and the remaining general partners must address the issue of in-
demnification of the removed and substituted general partners.
Because the removed general partner remains personally liable for
pre-removal transactions, he may seek indemnification for any sub-
sequent claims.2 58 Similarly, the new general partner assumes un-
limited personal liability upon admission and, thus, will seek in-
demnification for claims arising from his predecessor's actions.2 59
The partners may be forced to resolve this issue prior to the ad-
mission of the substituted general partner because the substitute
partner probably will not be willing to assume general liability
otherwise.
The partnership also must determine the removed general
partner's compensation, absent an applicable provision in the part-
nership agreement. A value must be established for the removed
general partner's interest and the partnership must decide whether
to repay him in cash or with a promissory note.260 A removed gen-
eral partner generally prefers cash to a note because he no longer
controls the partnership's management and cannot personally en-
sure repayment.281
3. Limited Partnership Certificate Amendments
Both removal of a general partner and admission of an addi-
tional or substitute general partner necessitate an amendment to
the partnership certificate.2 62 The certificate serves as notice to
third parties of the partnership agreement's fundamental terms,
particularly the extent of the limited partners' liability.263 Failure
to amend the certificate upon the removal and substitution of gen-
eral partners could jeopardize the assets of the limited partnership
and its members because third parties, reasonably relying on the
unamended certificate, might enter into a contract with the re-
258. See Coleman & Weatherbie, supra note 6, at 914.
259. See id.
260. See Roulac, supra note 8, at 296.
261. See id. Thus, if the limited partnership is experiencing negative cash flow, possi-
bly caused by the removed general partner's mismanagement, the removed general partner
may demand higher compensation if a note must be used in payment. Of course, this
demand is subject to negotiation.
262. ULPA § 24(b),(d),(e); RULPA § 204(a),(b). The official comment to RULPA
§ 204 notes that the addition, substitution, or withdrawal of partners each constitutes an
event that is central to the function of the certificate.
263. See Brown v. Panish, 99 Cal. App. 3d 429, 160 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1979).
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moved general partner.26 4 Additionally, if the removed general
partner assumes "special limited partner" status and no amend-
ment to the certificate is filed, third parties may rely on the origi-
nal certificate and the "special limited partner" could incur unlim-
ited personal liability.
ULPA section 2565 sets forth procedural requirements for
amending the limited partnership certificate. This provision re-
quires that the amendment "be signed and sworn to by all mem-
bers. 26 6 At first glance, this requirement provides general partners
with a method to circumvent removal because they merely could
refuse to sign the amendment.6 7 State statutes, however, com-
monly provide statutory mechanisms to execute writings despite
the refusal of a necessary party.268 RULPA section 204 avoids this
problem by requiring the signature of only one general partner.269
B. Claims of the General Partner upon Removal
As a matter of law, the limited partners may remove a general
partner if they comply with the partnership agreement's removal
provision. If the partnership agreement expressly empowers a spe-
cific percentage of interests in the limited partnership to remove a
general partner, then removal becomes effective when the voting
percentage is acquired.27 0 No judicial intervention is needed to ac-
complish removal2 71 if the parties unconditionally agree to the re-
moval provision by signing the partnership agreement and any
subsequent action by the courts is purely ministerial.272
264. See, e.g., Gilman Paint & Varnish Co. v. Legum, 197 Md. 665, 80 A.2d 906 (1951).
265. ULPA § 25.
266. Id. at § 25(1)(b).
267. See Consortium Management Co. v. Mutual Am. Corp., 246 Ga. 346, 271 S.E.2d
488 (1980).
268. See id.; GA. CODE ANN. § 14-9-26(c) (1982) (permitting petition of court to direct
amendment).
269. RULPA § 204(a)(2); 1985 ULPA § 204(a)(2).
270. Consortium Management Co. v. Mutual Am. Corp., 246 Ga. 346, 271 S.E.2d 488
(1980). In Consortium Management Co., the partnership agreement required a vote of
seventy-five percent of the limited partnership interests to remove a general partner. The
corporate holder of an eighty percent interest in the limited partnership notified all the
other partners that it was exercising its right to remove the general partners and to substi-
tute itself and an individual of its choosing as general partners. Id. at 346, 271 S.E.2d at 489.
271. Id. at 348, 271 S.E.2d at 490.
272. Id. In Consortium Management Co., following removal, the remaining general
partners refused to execute an amendment to the certificate of limited partnership to show
the change in general partners. The new general partners brought an action to direct the
court clerk to record the amendment. They also sought an injunction to compel the former
general partners to relinquish the partnership's records and to prohibit them from interfer-
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The general partner, once he is removed, is not entitled to re-
instatement even if the legal efficacy of the vote is questioned.27
The Georgia Supreme Court addressed this issue in Lesesne v.
Mast Property Management, Inc.2 7 4 In Lesesne a removed general
partner challenged the validity of the limited partners' vote. The
removed general partner alleged that the votes had been obtained
by fraud and misrepresentation on the part of one of the limited
partners.2 7 5 The removed general partner sought to set aside the
limited partners' removal vote and appointment of a substitute
general partner.2 76 The court analogized the factual situation to a
wrongful employment termination case. 7 Consequently, the court
held that the removed general partner had no right to reinstate-
ment regardless of his fraud and misrepresentation claim. 278 Re-
moval of a general partner cannot be enjoined if the removal provi-
sion of the partnership agreement is met; instead, a removed
general partner must institute a claim at law for damages.279
ing with business operations. Id. at 346-47, 271 S.E.2d at 489. Initially, it appeared that the
general partners could prevent consummation of the transaction, initially agreed to in the
partnership agreement, by refusing to sign the amendment substituting the new general
partners. Furthermore, the new general partners could not secure service of process on a
former general partner who resided outside the forum state. Id. The court determined that
personal service on the former general partner was unnecessary. In addition, because the
new general partners had a right to have the writing executed, the court ordered the clerk to
record the amendment. Id. at 348, 271 S.E.2d at 490. The court noted that its function in
the case was purely ministerial because removal became effective upon the limited partner's
vote. Id.
273. See Lesesne v. Mast Property Management, Inc., 251 Ga. 550, 307 S.E.2d 661
(1983).
274. Id.
275. The removed general partner claimed that one of the limited partners made
fraudulent statements in asserting that the limited partners were not receiving a return on
their investment because of the removed general partner's mismanagement of partnership
property. Id. at 551, 307 S.E.2d at 662.
276. Id. The limited partnership agreement provided that limited partners whose
aggregate interest exceeded fifty percent could remove the general partners and select an
experienced individual or corporation to become the substitute general partner and assume
control of the limited partnership's business operations. Id. Pursuant to these provisions,
the limited partners removed the general partner and appointed a substitute general
partner.
277. Id. at 552, 307 S.E.2d at 663. See Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 250
S.E.2d 442 (1978), (denying that employment terminable at will creates a cause of action
against the employer for wrongful termination, but stating that an action may be main-
tained against a third party for tortious interference with an employment contract), rev'd on
other grounds, 249 Ga. 180, 289 S.E.2d 514 (1982).
278. Lesesne, 251 Ga. at 552, 307 S.E.2d at 663.
279. The court in Lesesne held that the removed general partner might have a claim
for tortious interference with an employment relationship. Id.
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1. Tortious Interference with a Contractual Relationship
Following removal, a removed general partner may bring an
action for tortious interference with a contractual relationship
against a limited partner, a remaining general partner, or a third
party for procuring the removal maliciously and without just
cause.28 0 It is irrelevant that the contractual relationship could be
terminated at the will of the parties.28 1 A removed general partner
can pursue successfully an action for intentional interference with
a contractual relationship despite the fact that a limited partner-
ship can be dissolved judicially or contractually at the will of either
the general or limited partners.2 8 2 A tort action for intentional in-
terference with a contractual relationship arises when a person "in-
tentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a
contract . . . between another and a third person by inducing or
otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract. '283
To prevail in an action for tortious interference with a contractual
relationship, the removed general partner must prove: (1) that a
valid contract existed; (2) that the third party possessed knowledge
of the contract; (3) that the third party intended to procure its
breach; (4) that there was no legal justification for the third party's
interference; and (5) that damages resulted from the
interference. 28 4
The general partner first must prove that a valid, legally en-
forceable contract existed. The contractual relationship may derive
from either the limited partnership agreement or a separate man-
agement contract between the removed general partner and the
limited partnership. Courts disagree over whether the general part-
ner can bring an action for intentional interference if the partner-
ship agreement is the contract affected by the third parties' ac-
280. For purposes of this Note, tortious interference with a contractual relationship
contemplates intentional rather than negligent interference.
281. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 comment g (1977) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT]; see Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 281 Pa. Super. 560, 574-75 & n.6, 422 A.2d 611, 618
& n.6 (1980); Todd v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 283 S.C. 155, 163-64, 321 S.E.2d 602, 607
(1984), quashed in part, 287 S.C. 190, 336 S.E.2d 472 (1985); see also Kelly v. St. Vincent
Hosp., 102 N.M. 201, 207, 692 P.2d 1350, 1357 (Ct. App. 1984) (interfering with a contract
terminable at will is analogous to interfering with a prospective contract).
282. See ULPA §§ 10, 20; UPA § 38(2).
283. RESTATEMENT, supra note 281, § 766; see Wilmington Trust Co. v. Clark, 289 Md.
313, 329-30, 424 A.2d 744, 754 (1981); Kelly v. St. Vincent Hosp., 102 N.M. 201, 207, 692
P.2d 1350, 1356 (Ct. App. 1984); Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 281 Pa. Super. 560, 573-74,
422 A.2d 611, 618 (1980).
284. See Todd v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 283 S.C. 155, 163, 321 S.E.2d 602, 607
(1984), quashed in part, 287 S.C. 190, 336 S.E.2d 472 (1985).
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tions. Some courts maintain that an action for intentional
interference with contractual relations "will not lie against one who
is a party to the contract. ' 28 5 These courts assert that a suit for
breach of contract is the appropriate cause of action when one
party to an agreement alleges that the other party has interfered
with his contractual rights.286 Other courts, however, hold that par-
ties to the contract may be held liable for intentional interference
with the other party's contractual rights.8 7 In these jurisdictions a
cause of action may lie against the limited or remaining general
partners based on the partnership agreement.
Second, the removed general partner must show that the in-
terferor possessed actual knowledge of the contract at issue or
knowledge of facts that would enable the third party to reasonably
conclude that a contract existed. 88 Questions arise regarding what
facts or circumstances would evidence an implied knowledge of the
contract or notice of the contract's possible existence, thereby re-
quiring the third party's inquiry.2 9 The removed general partner,
however, should have little difficulty proving actual knowledge by
the limited and remaining general partners of the existence of the
partnership agreement. Similarly, the limited and remaining gen-
eral partners should have actual knowledge of a management con-
tract between the removed general partner and the limited
partnership.
Third, the removed general partner must prove that the other
partners' or third party's actions were malicious and that their in-
285. Id. at 164, 321 S.E.2d at 607; see Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp.
872 (S.D. Ga. 1983); George A. Davis, Inc. v. Camp Trails Co., 447 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Pa.
1978); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Clark, 289 Md. 313, 424 A.2d 744 (1981); Wild v. Rarig, 302
Minn. 419, 234 N.W.2d 775 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 902 (1976); Houser v. City of
Redmond, 91 Wash. 2d 36, 586 P.2d 482 (1978) (en banc); Board of Trustees v. Holso, 584
P.2d 1009 (Wyo. 1978).
286. See e.g., Wilmington Trust Co. v. Clark, 289 Md. 313, 329-30, 424 A.2d 744, 755
(1981).
287. See e.g., Murphy v. McIntyre, 69 N.C. App. 323, 328-29, 317 S.E.2d 397, 401
(1984); Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 221 S.E.2d 282 (1976).
288. Steinmetz & Assocs. v. Crow, 700 S.W.2d 276, 277-78 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
289. See 45 AM. Juia 2D Interference § 11 (1969), which states in pertinent part: "it is
not necessary to prove actual knowledge; it is enough to show that defendant had knowledge
of facts which, if followed by reasonable inquiry, would have led to complete disclosure of
the contractual relations and rights of the parties." Courts define knowledge as "a clear
perception of fact, an awareness of truth." In order to imply knowledge of the contract with
which the third party or partner interfered, a clear connection between known facts and
facts discoverable upon reasonable inquiry must be established. Mere suspicion or conjec-
ture does not constitute knowledge or a reasonable means of obtaining knowledge. Stein-
metz & Assocs. v. Crow, 700 S.W.2d 276, 280 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
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terference in fact caused a breach of the contractual relationship.
In the legal sense, a malicious act includes any intentional act, in
excess of legal authority, designed to injure a party to the contract
or to gain an advantage at that party's expense.2 90 Courts consider
many factors in determining whether an act is improper, including
the actor's conduct, his motive, the proximity of the actor's con-
duct to the interference, the interests of the parties, and the rela-
tionship of the parties.29" ' Thus, courts focus primarily on the ac-
tor's improper motive and the means employed to effectuate that
motive.292 Furthermore, the removed general partner must prove
that the other partners' or third party's actions induced or coerced
the other contractual parties to abandon the contact.293 In essence,
the removed general partner must establish that the contractual
relationship would have continued absent the other partners' or
third party's interference.
Finally, some courts require that the removed general partner
demonstrate that the other partners or third party possessed no
legal right, privilege, or justification for the interference.2 94 Indeed,
the actor is exempt from liability, even though his conduct may be
reprehensible, if he has a sufficient legal basis for inducing breach
of the contractual relationship.95 If the partnership agreement
grants limited partners the right to remove a general partner with-
out cause, and if the limited partners fully comply with the part-
nership agreement's removal provisions, then the limited partners'
contractual rights constitute a defense against the removed general
partner's action for tortious interference with a contractual
relationship.
290. See Murphy v. McIntyre, 69 N.C. App. 323, 328-29, 317 S.E.2d 397, 401 (1984).
291. Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 281 Pa. Super. 560, 574, 422 A.2d 611, 618 (1980);
RESTATEMENT, supra note 281, § 767.
292. In Kelly v. St. Vincent Hospital the court determined that tortious interference
with contractual relations can be accomplished by either the "improper motive solely to
harm the plaintiff, or by improper means." 102 N.M. 201, 207, 692 P.2d 1350, 1356 (Ct. App.
1984). The court held that a legitimate business purpose for an action dispelled any im-
proper motive and, in addition, defined improper means as "actions which are innately
wrongful or predatory in character." Id. at 207, 692 P.2d at 1356-57.
293. See Todd v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 283 S.C. 155, 164, 321 S.E.2d 602, 608
(Ct. App. 1984), quashed in part, 287 S.C. 190, 336 S.E.2d 472 (1985).
294. See, e.g., Murphy v. McIntyre, 69 N.C. App. 323, 329, 317 S.E.2d 397, 401 (1984).
295. See Childress v. Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 675, 84 S.E.2d 176, 182 (1954); Bruton v.
Smith, 225 N.C. 584, 586, 36 S.E.2d 9, 10 (1945) (stating that a "malicious motive makes a
bad act worse, but it cannot make that wrong which, in its own essence, is lawful").
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2. Tortious Interference with a Business Relationship
The removed general partner may file suit against the limited
partners, the remaining general partners, or against third parties
for tortious interference with a business relationship if the re-
moved partner cannot establish a cause of action for contractual
interference because an express management contract does not ex-
ist or because a jurisdictional law precludes him from basing a tort
action on the partnership agreement.2"' To establish a cause of ac-
tion for tortious interference with a business relationship, the re-
moved general partner must prove the existence of such a relation-
ship 297  and the interfering party's knowledge of that
relationship. 298 Additionally, he must demonstrate the interferor's
intent to injure the relationship299 and that the interference re-
sulted in damage. 00
The threshold requirement for maintaining a claim of tortious
interference with a business relationship is the establishment of
the existence of a business relationship. To determine whether a
business relationship exists, courts will make an ad hoc analysis of
the parties' actions. Some courts, however, have concluded that the
exchange of memoranda and correspondence between the parties
and the inspection of goods to be bought or sold are actions suffi-
cient to form a business relationship. 0 1 Once the injured party has
established the existence of a business relationship, he also must
prove that the interferor possessed the requisite knowledge of this
relationship. The surrounding facts and circumstances may imply
knowledge. 2  Furthermore, the complaining party need not estab-
296. See supra notes 285-88 and accompanying text.
297. See Miller Chem. Co. v. Tams, 211 Neb. 837, 841, 320 N.W.2d 759, 762 (1982);
Torbett v. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co., 314 S.E.2d 166, 173 (W. Va. 1983); Topline
Equip., Inc. v. Stan Witty Land, Inc., 639 P.2d 825, 829 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
298. See Miller Chem. Co. v. Tams, 211 Neb. 837, 841, 320 N.W.2d 759, 762 (1982);
Topline Equip., Inc. v. Stan Witty Land, Inc., 639 P.2d 825, 829 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
299. See Miller Chem. Co. v. Tams, 211 Neb. 837, 841, 320 N.W.2d 759, 762 (1982);
Classic. Instruments, Inc. v. VDO-Argo Instruments, Inc., 73 Or. App. 732, 751, 700 P.2d 677,
693 (1985); Torbett v. Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust Co., 314 S.E.2d 166, 173 (W. Va. 1983);
Topline Equip., Inc. v. Stan Witty Land, Inc., 639 P.2d 825, 829 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
300. See Taylor v. Sugar Hollow Park, Inc., 1 Conn. App. 38, 39, 467 A.2d 935, 936
(1983); Miller Chem. Co. v. Tams, 211 Neb. 837, 841, 320 N.W.2d 759, 762 (1982); Classic
Instruments, Inc. v. VDQ-Argo Instruments, Inc., 73 Or. App. 732, 751, 700 P.2d 677, 693
(1985); Torbett v. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co., 314 S.E.2d 166, 173 (W. Va. 1983);
Topline Equip., Inc. v. Stan Witty Land, Inc., 639 P.2d 825, 829 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
301. See, e.g., Topline Equip., Inc. v. Stan Witty Land, Inc., 639 P.2d 825, 829-30
(Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (finding that memoranda, inspection of the goods for sale, and adver-
tisement of the goods established a business relationship).
302. See id. at 830.
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lish that the interferor understood "the legal significance of such
facts.,"3 03
The removed general partner also must prove that the in-
terferor intended to disrupt the business relationship and that this
disruption injured the relationship and the removed partner. In
Topline Equipment, Inc. v. Stan Witty Land, Inc.304 Topline
Equipment interfered with an existing business relationship be-
tween the plaintiff, Stan Witty Land, and a third party, Northwest
Auction of Portland.3 05 Stan Witty Land and Northwest Auction
entered into a memorandum agreement to auction off logging
equipment. This equipment included several pieces covered by
contracts between Topline Equipment and Stan Witty Land.308
Topline Equipment notified the plaintiff that it would stop the
auction unless Stan Witty Land repaid certain debts that were se-
cured by the equipment as well as other unsecured debts. 7 The
court held that Topline Equipment's actions constituted inten-
tional interference with the business relationship between North-
west Auction and the plaintiff even though Topline Equipment al-
leged that it retracted its demands prior to the plaintiff's
cancellation of its auction contract and the resulting loss of prof-
its.308 Analogizing from Topline Equipment, a removed general
partner must prove that the interferor wrongfully intended to in-
duce his removal and that he sustained damages as a result.309
If the removed general partner establishes a prima facie case,
the interferor may assert an affirmative defense of legal justifica-
tion or privilege.3 10 Interference with a business relationship is jus-
tified as a matter of law "only when the interferor engages in the
exercise of an absolute right, equal or superior to the right which is
invaded." '11 Thus, if the partnership agreement grants an unquali-
303. See id.
304. 639 P.2d 825 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
305. Id. at 830.
306. Id. at 828.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 830:
309. A general partner could suffer monetary loss from the forfeiture, sale, or conver-
sion of his partnership interest.
310. See Topline Equipment, Inc. v. Stan Witty Land, Inc., 639 P.2d at 830 (holding
that the existence of a secured debt does not provide a creditor with an absolute right to
interfere with a contractual relationship); Torbett v. Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust Co., 314
S.E.2d 166, 173 (W. Va. 1983). Contra Bahleda v. Hankison Corp., 228 Pa. Super. 153, 156,
323 A.2d 121, 122-23 (1974) (holding that the lack of a privilege to interfere must be pled
and proved as an element of the tort).
311. Topline Equip., Inc. v. Stan Witty Land, Inc., 639 P.2d 825, 830 (Wash. Ct. App.
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fled right of removal, the limited partners may argue that their
interference with the removed general partner's business relation-
ship was privileged.
3. Tortious Interference with an Employment Relationship
The removed general partner may have an additional claim
against the limited partners, the remaining general partners, or
against third parties for tortious interference with an employment
relationship. If an employment contract is terminable at the will of
the parties, then it does not give rise to a cause of action for
wrongful termination against the limited partnership or its mem-
bers. 12 However, some courts have held that a removed general
partner still may bring an action against the limited partners or
third parties for tortious interference with an employment rela-
tionship.""3 A removed general partner need not establish even the
existence of an express employment contract.3 14
The general partner must prove that the limited partners or
third party maliciously interfered with his employment 1 5 and
caused his subsequent removal.316 Conduct will be deemed "mali-
cious" if the interferor intended, without justifiable cause, to inter-
fere with the general partner's rights.1 Thus, if the limited part-
ner or third party induces the general partner's removal through
fraud or misrepresentation, the removed general partner may have
a claim for tortious interference with an employment
relationship.1 8
1982).
312. See Lesesne v. Mast Property Management, Inc., 251 Ga. 550, 552, 307 S.E.2d
661, 663 (1983).
313. Id. In Lesesne the court analogized the removal of a general partner to the
wrongful termination of an employee and determined that the removed general partner
could not bring an action against a limited partner for wrongful termination. Instead, the
court stated that an action for tortious interference with the employment relationship stood
as the appropriate remedy.
314. Id.
315. See Architectural Mfg. Co. v. Airotec, Inc., 119 Ga. App. 245, 250, 166 S.E.2d 744,
747 (1969).
316. See Nager v. Lad'n Dad Slacks, 148 Ga. App. 401, 403-04, 251 S.E.2d 330, 333
(1978) (requiring employee to establish damages from the interferor's actions).
317. See Architectural Mfg. Co. v. Airotec, Inc., 119 Ga. App. 245, 250, 166 S.E.2d 744,
747 (1969).
318. See Lesesne v. Mast Property Management, Inc., 251 Ga. 550, 307 S.E.2d 661
(1983).
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V. A PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATION
Modern limited partnerships are often extensive organizations
consisting of hundreds of members that conduct business on an
interstate or national level.3 19 Today's limited partners purchase
limited partnership interests primarily as investments;3 20 therefore,
they require the means to supervise effectively the partnership's
management because management's decisions will affect materially
the value of the limited partners' investments.321 Considering the
changes in the modern limited partnership's structure, its use as
an investment vehicle,22 and the policies underlying the uniform
limited partnership laws, '32 3 limited partners should be granted the
statutory right to remove a general partner to insure that they can
supervise adequately their investments.
The Commissioners should amend the 1985 ULPA to include
a removal right for limited partners as a method of resolving in-
trapartnership disputes without necessitating dissolution. In es-
sence, the 1985 ULPA encourages limited partners to seek judicial
resolution of intrapartnership problems, yet judicial remedies are
often wholly inadequate in the modern limited partnership con-
text.2 The 1985 ULPA should be modified to include a right of
removal that would give limited partners an effective mechanism
for resolving intrapartnership disputes concerning the management
of their investments. Furthermore, limited partnership agreements
often include poorly drafted removal provisions. As a result, litiga-
tion and judicial intervention usually are required to resolve subse-
quent disputes. To eliminate this problem, the statutory amend-
ment should provide adequate guidelines for drafting removal
provisions. These guidelines should set forth procedures for re-
moval and specific limitations on the limited partners' exercise of
these rights. Additionally, the amendment should protect the par-
ties' freedom to contract; therefore, the limited partners' removal
right should be subject to certain modifications by the partnership
agreement.
319. See generally Publicly Traded Limited Partnerships: An Emerging Financial
Alternative to the Public Corporation, 39 Bus. LAw. 709 (1984).
320. See Basile, supra note 27, at 1218; Lipman, Real Estate Syndicators Dream Up
Exotic Deals to Win Back Investors, Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1985, at 23, col. 4.
321. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text; see generally Comment, supra
note 34, at 123-28.
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To achieve these objectives, the Commissioners should adopt a
statute similar to the following:
The limited partnership agreement must provide that at least a majority of
the limited partners, without the necessity for concurrence by the general
partner(s), may remove the general partner(s) and must further provide:
(1) that limited partners whose aggregate percentage of interests equal or ex-
ceed twenty percent may notify the general partner(s) that they wish to pro-
pose the removal of the general partner(s) and the general partner(s) must
notify all limited partners of the proposal by either
(a) mailing, within thirty days, a notice describing the proposal and con-
taining a ballot to be returned within ten days indicating the limited part-
ner's approval of or opposition to said proposal; or
(b) notifying the limited partners of the proposal within ten days and
calling, within thirty days, a partnership meeting at which time the limited
partners will vote on said proposal;
(2) a detailed provision for the purchase of the removed general partner's
interest, excluding any interest he may have as a limited partner, and includ-
ing within the provision
(a) a fair valuation method of the general partner's interest; and
(b) a fair method of payment that protects the liquidity and solvency of
the partnership.
This proposed statutory provision promotes freedom of con-
tract by allowing the contracting parties to negotiate the requisite
voting percentage required to effect removal. 25 If the parties de-
termine that a supermajority vote, rather than a simple majority
vote, is appropriate, they can incorporate such a provision in their
partnership agreement. Additionally, the proposed provision does
not specify the basis for a removal vote. Thus, parties may choose
to base the vote on an aggregate percentage of partnership inter-
ests, on the dollar amount invested by limited partners, or on a per
capita basis.3 2 6 Similarly, the proposed provision is silent regarding
the limited partners' right to remove a general partner with or
without "cause," thereby alleviating the problem of defining
"cause". Likewise, it allows the parties to negotiate this term in
light of their decision to require a* majority or supermajority vote
and the inherent nature of their partnership business. s However,
to qualify for limited partnership taxation status, the parties must
"substantially restrict", as specified in the applicable treasury reg-
ulations, the limited partners' removal power 3 28
To protect the efficacy of the limited partners' removal right,
section 1 of the proposed provision sets forth the basic procedural
325. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
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requirements for notification and voting.32 9 Drafters often insert
removal provisions in partnership agreements without specifying
adequate procedures to effect removal. Without clear notification
and voting procedures, the validity of a vote to remove a general
partner might be subsequently challenged in court.330 Thus, an ab-
sence of procedural requirements could thwart the effectiveness of
removal as a nonjudicial dispute resolution method. Furthermore,
sections 1(a) and (b) of the proposed provision grant general part-
ners a reasonable period of time to notify the limited partners of
an upcoming removal vote and to prepare a rebuttal to any allega-
tions set forth in the notice.33 1
Section 2(a) of the proposed provision requires an express val-
uation method for assessing the value of the general partner's in-
terest and section 2(b) mandates a fair method of payment. The
provision, however, does not stipulate a specific basis for determin-
ing fair value. Instead, the parties may negotiate the valuation
method vis-a-vis the nature of the partnership business. The part-
ners could employ several different methods of valuation, including
arbitration, computation of net partnership earnings, or appraisal
of the partnership's net assets. 2  Furthermore, the parties can
structure the general partner's payment to prevent unduly ham-
pering the limited partnership's cash flow. 33 3
The proposed removal provision grants limited partners the
most direct method of influencing partnership management and
protecting their investment. Additionally, the provision insures
that general partners will receive fair treatment upon removal re-
garding their partnership interest. Furthermore, if the general
partner wishes to contribute significant amounts of capital to the
limited partnership, he may protect his contribution by investing
as a limited partner and, thus, exercise any voting rights granted to
limited partners by the partnership agreement.3 34 The proposed
provision balances the competing interests of all parties involved.
VI. CONCLUSION
Limited partners clearly need a statutory right of removal as a
method of resolving intrapartnership disputes. The RULPA's
329. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 274-79 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 275-80 and accompanying text.
334. See Note, supra note 75, at 295 & n.33; ULPA § 13.
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drafters intended to expand limited partners' supervisory powers
over their own investments. However, the absence of bargaining
power on the part of limited partners during the negotiation of
partnership agreements renders the drafters' efforts moot. Limited
partners have no effective mechanism for instituting managerial
change and protecting their investment. A statutory right to re-
move general partners would enable limited partners to assess the
quality of managerial performance and to respond accordingly to
reports of a general partner's gross negligence, self-dealing, mis-
management, or fraud. Absent an explicit right of removal, limited
partners must tolerate the general partner's mismanagement, sell
their partnership interest, or dissolve the partnership. These alter-
natives, in essence, deny limited partners the right to investment
protection rather than promote investor supervision as the
RULPA's drafters intended. Thus, given the proliferation of lim-
ited partnerships formed as investment vehicles and the opportu-
nities for potential abuse by general partners, legislators cannot
continue to ignore the limited partners' need for a statutory right
of removal to protect their investments.
Janet L. Eifert*
* The author greatly appreciates the assistance of Rhys T. Wilson, Esq., a member of
Harkleroad & Hardy, Atlanta, Georgia.
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